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Consumer behavior has changed in recent times. All businesses – and especially sport – need 
to evolve with the times. The aim of this paper is to research how it will be possible to develop 
South African rugby franchises into inclusive and successful business models. This study looks 
at the current financial business models for rugby that are prevalent in South Africa. I will use 
the Sharks (Pty) Ltd as the case study for the research. The findings will then be compared to 
similar professional rugby franchises in overseas countries.  
This will be important as South Africa is a unique country with unique challenges. These 
challenges will need to be fully understood before they can be successfully addressed. It is 
important to understand the revenue streams within sport generally and rugby in particular. The 
transformation and development of rugby in South Africa will be the most important part of 
the research. To ensure that rugby is inclusive and successful, we need a healthy business with 
good values and a strong vision of a unified rainbow sporting nation. The integrity of the 
current structures must be considered. Strengths and weaknesses must be identified and a 
sustainable model needs to be developed.  
The study was undertaken with sensitivity and respect towards all parties involved. It does not 
aim to single out any specific racial or cultural group in South Africa. The sole purpose of this 
research, and its ultimate goal, is to create a sustainable inclusive business that will embrace 
all people living in the rainbow nation. 
I conducted an extensive literature review that focused on three areas, which are: rugby as a 
business; player exodus; and transformation in rugby. In the study, I used a methodology that 
combined deductive and inductive research strategies. The initial part of the research was 
primarily a deductive, quantitative research strategy. This was an analysis of the past and 
present state of rugby in relation to business, transformation and player retention. The second 
thrust of the research shifted to the development and testing of a hypothesis for a more inclusive 
and sustainable model than that tested above. To do this, I used the inductive approach, 





The study is significant as it gives a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
professional and amateur rugby in South Africa, understanding the history of rugby and what 
will be required to ensure that rugby becomes an inclusive sport. It provides a framework for 
greater synergy between the professional and the amateur divisions of rugby in South Africa 
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As per the Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment Act: 
 
“black people” means African, Coloured or Indian persons who are natural persons and: 
1)  are citizens of the Republic of South Africa by birth or by descent; or 
 
2) are citizens of the Republic of South Africa by naturalization before the 
commencement date of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act of 
1993: or 
 
3) became citizens of the Republic of South Africa after the commencement date 
of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa Act 0f 1993, but who, but 
for the Apartheid policy that had been in place prior to that date would have 
been entitled to acquire citizenship by naturalization prior to that date 
(Government of South Africa, 2014). 
  
“white people” will be all people with origins in Europe, Middle East or North Africa 
 
Due to the nature of the research done in this paper and to correctly explain the history of rugby 
in South Africa, I will use the terms “coloured” as well as “black”. 
 
The terms to describe different races in this paper is in accordance with the above-mentioned 
Act, and is necessary to include in this paper in order to understand the South African racial 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1  Introduction to rugby: background to research 
 
South African rugby teams are respected and feared throughout the rugby-playing world. Since 
re-entry into international sport in 1994, the national team, the Springboks, has won the World 
Cup on two occasions: first in 1995 (Pienaar Francois with Griffiths Edward, 1999) and again 
in 2007 (Greenaway, 2009). Sport, and more specifically rugby, has historically been a 
fundamental part of South African culture. It represents a microcosm of South African society 
(Department of Sport and Recreation, 2013). It has had an undeniable socio-political impact 
from community level through to national and international competitions.  
With such high viewer and participant interest levels, and a reach that far surpasses most 
organizations (Repucom, 2015a), rugby has necessarily undergone transformation in recent 
decades, from a recreational activity into a significant business with high revenue. In 2008 the 
South African Rugby Union’s (SARU) annual financial statements showed revenue of R438m, 
increasing to R1 227bn budgeted for 2016 (SARU, 2015).  
Rugby unions and franchises have evolved into large commercial businesses, with a 
professional and corporate focus. Coupled with the growing international contracts for local 
rugby players, professional rugby franchises are under pressure to be profitable and ultimately 
sustainable. As an example, in an article posted on News24 on 20 March 2016, it was reported 
that the Eastern Province Rugby Union is facing liquidation for owing staff and players around 
R18m in unpaid wages (News24, 2016).  
The financial pressure that professional rugby teams find themselves under is not limited to 
South African franchises. Saracens, the 2016/2017 European Cup champion, has the largest 
debt of any rugby team in world rugby. An article in the UK newspaper the Daily Mail 
mentions this figure as exceeding £45m. This makes Saracens the most indebted club in rugby 
history (Harris, 2016).  
The French rugby league, known as the Ligue Nationale de Rugby (LNR), created a financial 
regulating body for the sport, known as the Direction Nationale d’Aide et de Controle de 




a team is found guilty of non-compliance with the DNACG regulations, it can be financially 
relegated to a lower division. In the book Confessions of a Rugby Mercenary, the author recalls 
that between 2002 and 2008 Toulon, Colomiers, Begles-Bordeaux and Grenoble were 
regulated due to financial reasons (Daniell, 2009).   
In this study I will investigate and identify the impact of perceived threats to rugby as a 
business.  
The main concerns and threats to the current rugby franchises include, first, the fact that rugby’s 
historical supporter base is shrinking. Research data gathered on a year-to-year basis shows 
that the number of white people following rugby has declined from 78% of the total white 
population in 2003 to 64% in 2013 (BMI, 2014). This decline in white support is seen as a 
threat to rugby, in part because rugby is still seen as a whites-only sport.  
Through racial segregation enforced by the white South African government between 1948 and 
1994 (Heere et al., 2013), other races were supposedly excluded from participating in sport 
during this period. This perception will have to be changed for rugby to be seen as an inclusive 
South African sport. Second, the robust international market, fueled by strong European and 
Asian currencies, attracts increasing numbers of talented players to foreign clubs. In 2009, 27 
Springboks (previous and current) were based overseas, while in 2014 46 Springboks (previous 
and current) were playing abroad (Steyn, 2014).  
While we are losing many Springboks to European clubs and battling to keep the best players 
in South Africa (Burnard, 2015), it is also important to note that we are losing other rugby 
talent to overseas clubs. In 2013, 233 South African players were based at overseas clubs 
(Steyn, 2014). When talking about the financial pressures facing South African rugby and the 
number of high profile players leaving South Africa to play abroad, the Chairman of The 
Sharks (Pty) Ltd board, Mr Stephen Saad, said: “It’s also important to consider that in 
December 2013, the rand-dollar exchange was eight to one, and today it’s over 14. Our player 
base face offers in euros and yen, and so there is very real pressure on player salaries. We can 
cry and say we only have X million, or you can work smarter.” (Lewis, 2016).  
A third threat to rugby is the perceived slow rate of transformation in the sport, and the impact 
that the quota system has on the ultimate product sold to the consumer (Hoskins, 2014). Sport 
in South Africa is required to transform. In April 2016 the Minister of Sport, Fikile Mbalula, 




lack of transformation (Ngoepe, 2016). My research will involve an in-depth analysis of these 
challenges, to establish the direct impact they have on the overall profitability and longevity of 
professional rugby in South Africa. Ultimately, I will provide workable solutions to each of 
the challenges outlined above, by developing a business model which will use The Sharks (Pty) 
Ltd as the principle case study. 
 
1.2. Chronological timeline of important events in the history of South African 
rugby 
	
• 1823 – William Webb Ellis catches ball in soccer match, start of rugby 
• 1841 – First written rules for Rugby 
• 1861 – Rugby-Football introduced to South Africa by Canon George Ogilvie 
• 1870 –  Rugby Football Union (RFU) accepts the rules 
• 1875 – Hamilton’s Rugby Club established as first rugby club in South Africa 
• 1882 – Formation of South African Rugby Association (SARA) 
• 1884 – First inter-town matches played between Kimberley and Cape Town 
• 1886 – Western Province Coloured Rugby Union formed (WPCRU) 
• 1887 – Union Rugby Club, the first black rugby club, was formed 
• 1889 –South African Rugby Board (SARB), the white rugby federation, was formed in 
Kimberley 
• 1891 – British Isles tour South Africa and donates the Currie Cup 
• 1892 – Official inauguration of the Currie Cup. Western Province were the first 
tournament winners 
• 1897 – South African Coloured Rugby Football Board (SACRFB) was formed 
• 1902 – Rugby match between Boer and British Armies 




• 1921 – Springboks tour New Zealand. This was the first contact between the two 
powers in world rugby 
• 1935 – South African Bantu Rugby Board (SABRB) was formed 
• 1950 – The National Party enacts the Group Areas Act, and legally and physically 
divides South African rugby along racial boundaries 
• 1967 – Prime Minister HF Verwoerd refuses visas to Maori players. In response, New 
Zealand cancels its tour to South Africa 
• 1969 – Anti-apartheid demonstrators disrupt Springboks tour of Britain 
• 1970 – The first Maoris and Samoan tour of South Africa with New Zealand 
• 1976 – The National Party announces that multi-nationalism in sport will allow Blacks 
to participate with whites, pending special permission 
• 1981 – Springboks tour New Zealand. Second match cancelled due to protestors 
• 1981 – Errol Tobias is the first black player to represent South Africa in a test 
• 1983 – French Rugby tour to South Africa cancelled 
• 1984-1992 – South Africa banned from the International Rugby Board as a result of the 
nation’s continued apartheid policies 
• 1988 – Danie Craven and Louis Luyt meet with ANC representatives to discuss 
formation of single, non-racial governing body for South African Rugby 
• 1992 – Inauguration of South African Football Union in Kimberley 
• 1995 – South Africa host and win the Rugby World Cup. Nelson Mandela wins the 
hearts of our nation by wearing Francois Pienaar’s No.6 Springbok jersey 
• 1998 – South Africa wins the Tri-Nations tournament for the first time 
• 1998 – Silas Nkanunu appointed as president of South African Rugby Football Union 
(SARFU) 
• 2003 – Race fallout between Springbok teammates, Geo Cronje and Quentin Davids 
before the Rugby World Cup 




• 2006 – 20-year old Chiliboy Ralepelle becomes the first black player to captain the 
Springboks 
• 2007 - South Africa wins the Rugby World Cup (RWC) in France, with John Smit as 
captain 
• 2008 – South Africa appoints Peter de Villiers as the first non-white Springbok coach 
• 2009 – South Africa wins the Tri-Nations and beats the British Lions in a three-match 
series 2-1 
• 2016 – Alistair Coetzee becomes the second coloured coach of the Springboks and 
appoints Mzwandile Stick, as his assistant. Stick is the first black African assistant 
Springbok coach 
 
1.2.1  Broad history of rugby in South Africa from 1823 through until 1990 
 
The sport we know as Rugby was born in Warwickshire, England in 1823, when a school boy 
named William Webb Ellis caught the ball during a football match and ran to the opposing 
side’s goal posts. He put the ball down for what is now known to be a try in rugby union and 
that was the start of what is officially known as Rugby (Smiles, 2012). The first written rules 
for rugby were established in 1840 and in 1870 the Rugby Football Union (RFU) accepted 
these rules. 
A man named George Ogilvie is credited with introducing rugby to South Africa. He was 
principal of Diocesan School – better known as Bishops – in Cape Town from 1861 to 1885 
(van der Berg, 2011). At the same time as rugby started in schools, the British army units also 
started playing rugby in Cape Town. The first recorded match between the Officers and the 
Civil Services took place in Green Point, Cape Town, and was reported in the Cape Argus of 
21 August 1862 (van der Berg, 2011). 
These matches went on for 10 years, but they were unscheduled and not played regularly. A 
more formal structure was created, which became the first rugby club in South Africa. The 
Hamilton Rugby Club was formed in 1875, and is officially regarded as the oldest rugby club 




Although this overview of the origin of black and coloured rugby in South Africa is not aimed 
at providing a definitive history, it will help the reader to understand that the myth of rugby 
being a white elitist sport that only included black people after 1994 is fundamentally wrong. 
There is a common belief that rugby was historically only a sport played by white South 
Africans. The researcher aims to prove that we can set aside the myth of rugby being 
historically a whites-only sport by looking into the history of South African rugby (Odendaal 
1995:25 from Smiles).  
The rich history of black and coloured South Africans participating in rugby is well-
documented. In an article on News24, titled “A legacy forgotten”, Gary Boshoff writes that 
often the history of black and coloured rugby isn’t mentioned when discussing the history of 
the sport in South Africa. He also mentioned how the players and administrators were 
oppressed, but nothing could break their passion for the sport they loved. (Boshoff Gary, 2004)  
In an interview in 2016, Graham Abrahams, Director of Enterprises and Regulatory Affairs at 
SuperSport, tells the story of when he watched young kids play rugby: “I will never forget 
many years ago on a Saturday morning I went to Loftus to watch what was known then as 
bokkie rugby. Little five-year old kids being introduced to the game. There were some white 
kids running with the ball, there were some black kids running with the ball and a white 
Afrikaner mom came to stand alongside me, very proud of her little five-year old. In 
Afrikaans she said to me this little black boy is five years old, introduced to the game, can 
learn from the little five-year old white boys introduced to the game. I don’t think she was 
being malicious. It is a genuine belief that transformation is for you guys, development is for 
you guys, we’re seasoned, we know this.” This story illustrates that the perception exists 
among certain white South Africans that rugby is a white sport and transformation is needed 
to introduce rugby to the non-white population of South Africa. 
 
1.2.2  Rugby in Coloured communities 
	
As rugby spread though South Africa in the late 19th century, it was adopted not only by the 
white population of the country, but also by non-white communities. There is little argument 
that rugby was the dominant sport in the Cape. Nauright dates the origin of coloured rugby in 
Cape Town to 1886, when two unions were established in Cape Town, each administering their 




was formed in 1886, and the City and Suburban Rugby Union (CSRU), which was founded 
twelve years later in 1898. 
The sport was encouraged in coloured schools as the teachers believed that it taught valuable 
life skills to young men, including physical and mental toughness and social cohesion. The 
sport continued to grow rapidly among the coloured community in Cape Town. It could be 
argued that rugby brought an entire community together (Bolligelo, 2006). 
Coloured rugby expanded through the country, leading to the ultimate formation of the South 
African Coloured Rugby Football Board (SACRFB) in 1897 (Cupido, 2014). When the 
SACRFB met again the following year, in 1898, representatives from Western Province, 
Eastern Province, Griqualand West and the Transvaal Coloured Unions attended.  
To this day, coloured rugby has a very strong following in the Western Cape. Considerably 
more coloured rugby players play for the Springboks than black African players. In an 
interview on 14 June 2016, Abrahams recounts how the coloured community faced challenges 
to establish their own rugby club in Cape Town, but, driven by their passion for the game, they 
managed to acquire an area: “There was a group of people who decided to acquire their own 
ground for rugby under what was known then as the Provincial Union known as City and 
Suburban Rugby Union. It was basically based in greater Cape Town in Mowbray area. They 
acquired land along the Liesbeek River. In actual fact they made a loan and acquired land from 
an estate agent at that time known as Syfrets Trust. They played rugby there, they laid their 
own grounds, they put up their own fence, got their own turnstiles and change rooms and they 
played their rugby there every Saturday. When the Liesbeek rose up in flood the field was 
flooded and they couldn’t play on that day. Then in the 1950s tragically, the land was 
expropriated by the Apartheid Government under the pretext of education and I think they were 
paid a measly sum of seven thousand pounds for the land and told to go away. They then moved 
to the Cape Flats, Athlone where they again from scratch purchased bush land, totally covered 
in bush. People cleared it with their own hands, put up [a] concrete wall and build [sic] what is 
today known as City Park. It still stands there. Amazingly today City Park is used by the 
Western Province Rugby Union as their alternate ground to Newlands.” 
This testimony highlights the fact that non-white communities have historically been 
passionate about rugby. It shows that apartheid was the main reason for a lack of inclusion, and 





1.2.3  Rugby in Black communities 
	
Nauright states that rugby and cricket were established amongst the black communities in the 
urban areas of South Africa. Soccer and boxing followed (Nauright, 1997). This is in stark 
contrast with the perception that soccer has always been the preferred and dominant sport 
among black South Africans. Rugby in black communities was a vital part of social life, with 
a strong affiliation to clubs and passionate support from the community toward the players. 
There was a strong sense of community. It has been documented that players played until much 
later on, in life, some even past the age of 40 (Smiles, 2012). 
The first black teams came out of Grahamstown, where St Andrews College’s headmaster, 
Reverend Mullins, introduced rugby to the black community (Smiles, 2012). Rugby stalwart 
Stephan Katta formed the first black club in Port Elizabeth in 1885 (Boshoff Gary, 2004). 
Odendaal cites rugby historian Braber Ngozi who believes the first black club was a union 
rugby club formed in KwaMpundu, in 1887. Orientals, the second black club, was formed in 
1894, followed by Morning Star, Rovers, Frontier and Spring Rose (Odendaal, 1995). 
The Eastern Cape became a stronghold for black rugby. This was evident in 1934, when 10 
clubs were entered in the local competition, known as the Martin Cup. Black rugby didn’t just 
end in the Eastern Cape. The then-Transvaal followed and, with the formation of the clubs 
Swallows and United, black rugby grew. The South African Bantu Rugby Board (SABRB) 
was formed in 1935 (Odendaal, 1995). Opinions may differ about which was the first black 
rugby club to be formed, and the exact date of its formation, but this part shows that the rich 
history of black rugby started at a similar time to the history of white rugby in South Africa. 
In the book, “Sport, Cultures and Identities in South Africa, Nauright claims that Kimberley is 
the cradle of black sport in South Africa. He describes how many diverse cultures descended 
on the diamond fields in 1867, when diamonds were discovered in Kimberley  (Nauright, 
1997). Whites, Coloureds and Blacks all hustled to claim a part of the diamond rush, either by 
mining the stones or working in the auxiliary industries that emerged to serve the influx of 
people. 
Black people from all over South Africa moved to Kimberley to seek jobs and profit from the 




was formed. Odendaal claims it was probably the first non-racial sports organization in South 
Africa, since it consisted of coloured, Malay and black clubs. It also did not discriminate on 
the basis of colour, nationality, language or religion. Odendaal further argues that the use of 
the word Colonial was deliberate: the union wanted to include all black groups in the newly 
formed sports body (Odendaal, 1995). 
The introduction shows that not only did a Coloured Rugby Union (SACRFB) and a Black 
Rugby Union (SABRB) exist, but also that the first Rugby union that included Coloured and 
Black players was formed under the banner of the Griqualand West Colonial Rugby Football 
Union (GWCRFU) as early as 1867. Eleven inter-racial test matches were played between two 
teams referred to as the South African Coloureds and the South African Bantus. These games 
were organized in response to apartheid laws prohibiting official tests for these federations 
(Bolligelo, 2006).  
These facts illustrate that contrary to the prevailing opinion shared by a majority of the white 
rugby community, other ethnic groups in South Africa share a strong and rich history of rugby 
union. This will also prove that transformation and development in South African rugby is not 
about introducing a foreign white elitist sport into a different culture, but much rather to 
promote and potentially re-ignite the long-burning passionate flame that was momentarily 
doused during apartheid, when black and coloured communities were excluded from the rugby 
family. 
 
1.3 Rugby in contemporary South Africa	
	
Historically, the success of South African rugby was built on the natural strength of South 
African players, the number of talented players that were produced and the near-fanatical 
following the game enjoyed. Domestic success spilled over when South Africa played 
internationally. The national team achieve the best test record in the world until 1991 (van der 
Berg, 2011). Rugby structures within the game in South Africa were considered to be the best 
in the world, with the Currie Cup deemed to be the best domestic competition in world rugby. 
The other provincial competitions, intervarsity tournaments and the strong school system 




South Africa’s re-admittance into international rugby, in 1992, was a rude awakening for the 
country. The Springboks won only one of five tests played in 1992 and the next year won just 
three test matches out of the seven played. It was clear that other rugby-playing countries had 
moved ahead during South Africa’s period of isolation from international competition. The  
mighty Springboks needed to play catch up to regain their former glory. 
The Springboks regained its place alongside the best teams in the world when the team won 
the Rugby World Cup in 1995 and in 2007. Apart from the success of the Springboks, other 
representative teams have also performed well on the international stage. The South African 
Sevens team, the Blitzboks, won an Olympic bronze medal at the 2016 Rio Olympic Games, 
and the South African junior teams have won the IRB Junior World Cup on numerous 
occasions. Many of these players went on to represent the senior national team (van der Berg, 
2011). It is possible to argue that the strength of South African rugby lies in the number of 
players playing the sport in South Africa. In 2010, South Africa had 472 915 rugby players 
compared with 131 384 in New Zealand and 82 790 in Australia (Lambert & Durandt, 2010).  
The strength of the South African game is attributed to the strong structures that were 
implemented and the sense of pride the country has for the Springbok team. Van den Berg 
(2011) describes the pillars of South African rugby as follows:  
• Super Rugby 
In 2016, the Super Rugby competition, which originally comprised South African, New 
Zealand and Australian teams, was expanded to include teams from Argentina and Japan. The 
South African teams who compete in Super Rugby are The Sharks, Bulls, Stormers, Cheetahs, 
Lions and the Kings. With the expansion of the competition to 18 teams, South Africa has the 
most teams in the competition with six, followed by New Zealand and Australia with five each 
and the new editions Japan and Argentina, with one team each. 
 
• Currie Cup 
The Currie Cup, which began in 1892, is the oldest provincial competition in the world. The 
competition was initially dominated by two sides, Western Province and Northern Transvaal 
(who later became the Blue Bulls). While the Sharks, Lions and Cheetahs achieved success at 




Province and Northern Transvaal/Blue Bulls (van der Berg, 2011). The Currie Cup is contested 
by the 14 provinces in South Africa. 
 
• South African Junior Sides 
The IRB Under-19 tournament was held from 1998 to 2007 and the Under-21 tournament was 
held between 1996 and 2006. In 2008, the Under-19 tournament and the Under-21 tournament 
was replaced by the IRB Under-20 World Championship. In the South African domestic 
competition, South Africa chose to stay with the two age groups — Under-19 and Under-21 
(van der Berg, 2011). 
 
• Youth Weeks 
Craven Week was first played in 1964 and seen as the greatest tournament for schools in the 
world (van der Berg, 2011). Currently, the primary school Craven Week and high school 
Craven Week tournaments are played annually. Provincial school boy teams are selected to 
play against other provinces during the week. The concept of the Craven Week was expanded 
to include an Academy Week for players who missed out on selection for the Craven Week. 
Another Under-16 week is named after leading rugby administrator Grant Khomo. These 
additional weeks allow for more than 1 500 boys to represent their provinces (van der Berg, 
2011). The South African Schools team is named at the end of the Craven Week tournament. 
 
• Varsity Cup/Varsity Shield 
First introduced in 2008, the Varsity Cup is an inter-university competition, which sees eight 
of the nation’s leading universities play against each other every year. In addition to this 
tournament, Varsity Shield competition is a second-division Varsity Cup competition 
comprising 12 competing teams. Matches are played on a Monday night and are broadcast by 
SuperSport. As part of the Varsity Cup competitions, the residence competition, known as the 








• Sevens Rugby 
The South African Sevens team, better known as the Blitzboks, participate in the IRB Sevens 
circuit played in 10 different cities throughout the world (World Rugby, 2017a). The Blitzboks 
have been one of the most successful Sevens teams in the world and won the bronze medal at 
the Olympic Games held in Rio, in 2016. 
 
• Women’s Rugby 
Women’s rugby in South Africa has not been as successful as the men’s game. The South 
African women’s rugby team did not qualify for the 2017 World Cup in Ireland (World Rugby, 
2017b). When the team did participate in two World Cup tournaments, its performance was 
not up to standard. Its best World Cup finish was in 2010, when the team finished in 10th place 
(van der Berg, 2011). 
 
• Club Rugby 
The role of club rugby in South Africa is to develop rugby players to ultimately play provincial 
rugby. The club rugby system plays an integral role in South African rugby, as clubs form the 
amateur structure within the South African rugby provinces. This structure which currently 
holds the majority share in South African rugby, according to SARU’s constitution (SARU, 
2016). The most prestigious competition for non-university clubs in South Africa is known as 
the Gold Cup. 
 
South African rugby has a large pool of players and has the infrastructure to compete at all 
levels of the sport on the international stage. But for rugby to be inclusive and representative 
of all South Africans, the game needs to transform in both race and gender. The legacy left by 
apartheid threatens the future of rugby in contemporary South Africa and change is required. 
This change will have to be reflected in all of the structures mentioned above, as well as in the 









‘To me, playing rugby, our rugby, for money, is like paying a woman for sex. It is 
prostitution…when a player is paid to play then he isn’t playing for the love of the game 
anymore’. – Danie Craven (Bolligelo:2006) 
 
For much of the twentieth century, rugby union proudly fought against professionalism and 
looked down on the 13-man code of rugby league. Rugby league broke away from rugby union 
in 1892 when players in Yorkshire, England were compensated for missing work and their 
clubs were charged for compensating their players.  
The 13-man code became professional before the more traditional 15-man code. This led to 
high-profile rugby union players moving to rugby league to earn money and effectively became 
professional sportsman. Frano Botica, an All Black representative in union in the 1980s and 
the Welsh flyhalf Jonathan Davis, who played union for Wales in the 1980s, were the first, and 
most high-profile, players to switch codes from rugby union to rugby league for financial 
reasons. Both players became dual internationals, which means they represented their country 
in both codes.  
The highest profile South African rugby union player to cross codes was Springbok captain 
and eighth man Tiaan Strauss, who left South Africa to play rugby league in Australia in 1996. 
Rugby union became a professional sport in 1996, so Strauss was the last high profile player 
to leave rugby union purely for financial reasons. Strauss returned to union in 1998 (Wikipedia, 
2016). 
Professionalizing rugby has changed the sport entirely, from the boardroom all the way into 
the change room; from a professional team to the development of the sport in previously 
disadvantaged areas. The romantic notion of rugby being an amateur sport for decades came 
to an abrupt and final halt in 1995 when the sport officially turned professional in 1996. The 




sports. Cricket, rugby league, soccer, baseball and basketball switched from amateur to 
professional much earlier (Ryan, 2008). 
I mention ‘officially’ as rumours abounded of players being paid a long time before 1995. 
Bolligelo claims that the player transfer market in South Africa was well established in the 
1980s, with players moving provinces and relocating under the auspices of amateur sport. This 
gave birth to the term “shamateurism” (Bolligelo, 2006). Rugby union administrators began to 
change their views towards professionalism as early as the mid-1980s, softening their approach 
to transgressors of the amateur code. This was done to improve commercial opportunities for 
elite players, but did little to stop rugby union players from defecting to rugby league (Ryan, 
2008). 
The word shamateurism was a sarcastic term referring to amateur players getting paid to play 
rugby, without administrators admitting to the payments. 
Former national coach and rugby administrator Dr Danie Craven even went as far as to 
distinguish between a “Rebel” tour and an unofficial tour. On a rebel tour, players were paid. 
An unofficial tour wasn’t sanctioned by the International Rugby Board (IRB), which made it 
possible to pay players. These unsanctioned tours did not affect rugby union’s official amateur 
stance (Ryan, 2008). 
In an interview in February 2016, former SARFU CEO and Saracens CEO, Edward Griffiths 
mentions the fact that provincial rugby unions had big stadiums filled with supporters and very 
few expenses. These led to unions flush with cash who could lure players with payments made 
‘under the table’. Natal was skilled at attracting players away from their home provinces. A 
few examples of these movements in the age of shamateurism were Robert Du Preez, who 
moved from Northern Transvaal to Natal in 1992; Andre Joubert, who moved from the Free 
State to Natal in 1992 and Henry Honiball, who moved from Free State to Natal in 1990. 
Gary Teichmann – the successful Natal and Springboks captain – writes in his autobiography 
that South African rugby had been semi-professional since the 1986 Cavaliers tour. Teichmann 
says that the local transfer market was healthy during the 1980s and early 1990s. He further 
states that player payments often came in the form of not salaries, but rather in houses, jobs, 
cars or monthly payments (Teichmann, 2000). This would explain why many players moved 




The consensus at that point was that payment was acceptable as long as the payments were not 
for playing rugby. Rugby was played for love and not for money. This was in order if a player 
had other sources of income on the side, which would allow them to pursue their passion for 
playing rugby at the same time. This environment turned rugby into an elitist sport, separating 
the working class from the wealthy (Bolligelo, 2006). 
Most of the players feeding the clubs and provinces were amateurs. The provinces in turn 
reaped the rewards of sold-out stadiums on big match days. But the most important commodity 
– the player – was left out of the equation (Grundlingh, 2005). 
In 2016, rugby is a billion-rand industry, but the transition from an amateur sport to big 
business has not been an easy one. The global expansion of professional rugby, coupled with 
the rand’s depreciation against overseas markets, has forced local franchises to pay bigger 
salaries to keep players in South Africa. But the growing salary costs coupled with declining 
traditional revenue streams has left South African rugby franchises in financial distress.  
The EP Kings, a Super Rugby franchise, was officially liquidated in August 2016 after failing 
to honour player salaries. Its own players initiated liquidation proceedings (Sport24, 2016). 
Other South African rugby franchises are also struggling to run a profitable business. Even the 
most successful rugby union in South Africa – Western Province - applied for voluntary 
liquidation in November 2016 (Harrison, 2016), citing declining revenue and higher player 
salaries as reasons. Saracens, the English premiership champions, is rumored to be the most 
indebted rugby club in world rugby, with a total debt of $64.3million (sportbusinessdaily.com, 
2016).    
 
1.5 Problem statement 
 
In the world of sports, rugby was one of the last sports to shed its amateur status and fully 
embrace a professional era. This change has been accompanied by as many setbacks as 
successes, as each member country of the International Rugby Board had to deal with problems 
particular to their context.” A Bolligelo 2006 
The professional rugby sector has underestimated the value of innovation and new business 




successful business in an ever-changing financial, political and social environment is yet to be 
answered. Rugby franchises are presently under significant financial pressure and it is clear 
that the business model has to change (News24, 2016). 
This study aims to formulate an innovative and inclusive business model that will provide 
solutions to the problems that professional rugby franchises are currently facing. The model 
will propose practical and feasible strategies to achieve the government-set transformation 
targets to make rugby inclusive and representative of the South African population (Burnard 
Lloyd, 2016); as well as offering an achievable business model to make the franchises 
profitable. 
By necessity, inclusive innovation is the basis for developing these business and transformation 
strategies. Rugby has long been perceived as a sport that excludes people who suffered unfair 
discrimination under apartheid, whether in administrative structures or at the grassroots level.  
This research will indicate what progress has already been made to reverse this and also identify 
possible areas where transformation processes can be improved. This will be done through a 
review of pertinent literature including historical records, autobiographical accounts, journal 
articles, and statistical research reports; investigating the programmes in place, and through 
contact interviews with pertinent players, both on and off the field. The Sharks will be the 
principle case study, as a focus for the research problem, both for gathering data and 
formulating a business and transformation model.  
I played rugby for 27 years, including a period at professional level from 1998-2011. During 
my career I represented South Africa at national level for South African Schools, U/19, U/21, 
U/23, and South Africa “A” in 2003. I left South Africa to play professional rugby in France 
from 2005–2011.  
I am currently employed by The Sharks as Chief Operations Officer. My current position 
within a rugby franchise, and more specifically with The Sharks, allows access to relevant 
information as well as contact with stakeholders who will be valuable to the research. In 
addition, The Sharks franchise provides a live business model to analyze as the means to 
formulate a more inclusive business model.  
Examining the transformation of rugby in South Africa requires research into current 




the basis for a model which could be profitable for shareholders as well as being 
demographically representative of the country’s population. 
The research will combine multiple purposes: it will describe the present situation from rugby’s 
development into a professional sport to the current challenges facing the country’s franchises; 
it will explore alternative ways to improve the current business models and address 
transformation; and it will propose and explain a more inclusive and innovative model. 
 
1.5.1. Rugby as a business 
	
Rugby is a global business played in both the southern and northern hemispheres. Super Rugby 
is the southern hemisphere’s main product, currently broadcast to 18 different television 
networks. Argentina and Japan were added to South Africa, Australia and New Zealand in the 
new expanded annual competition.  
The northern hemisphere’s equivalent of Super Rugby is the Champions Cup. The Champions 
Cup is played in England, France, Ireland, Wales, Scotland and Italy.  
There is a correlation between the global growth of the game and the revenue generated from 
broadcasting rights. In 2016, SARU received R653m in broadcasting rights, increased from 
R328m in 2015 (SARU, 2015). This increase was passed down to the Super Rugby franchises, 
whose broadcasting rights increased from R14m per franchise to R28m per franchise.  
By contrast, in the French Top 14, the negotiated broadcasting rights increased from 31.7m 
Euro in the 2013- 2014 season to 97m Euro per season, effective from the 2018–2019 season 
(Thomas, 2016).  
The increased revenue in the northern hemisphere, as well as the depreciating rand, resulted in 
large numbers of top players leaving South Africa to play abroad. This trend left fewer high 
profile players playing in our local competitions such as the Currie Cup, which has in turn 
affected the product offering of South African teams – and more specifically stadium 
attendances. This has a direct impact on income streams and increases the reliance on 




Average year-on-year attendances at live rugby matches have declined by 4.8% from 2010–
2013 (Steyn, 2014). This leads to lower match day revenue generated from ticket sales and 
food and beverage sales. This presents an important need for a new business model to ensure 
the success of rugby as a business in the future. Historically, ticket sales generated the greatest 
revenue streams in South African rugby; and more specifically, season tickets and hospitality 
suite sales. 
As a provincial team, The Sharks has the largest supporter following in South Africa (Frontiers, 
2015): 35% of all South Africans support the Sharks. The franchise also has the largest social 
media following of all local super rugby teams. 
 
1.5.2.  Transformation in rugby 
	
"During my lifetime I have dedicated myself to this struggle of the African people. I have fought 
against white domination, and I have fought against black domination. I have cherished the 
ideal of a democratic and free society in which all persons live together in harmony and with 
equal opportunities. It is an ideal which I hope to live for and to achieve. But if needs be, it is 
an ideal for which I am prepared to die." – extract from Nelson Mandela’s statement at the 
opening of his defence in the Rivonia treason trial, April 20, 1964.  
 
“The time for the healing of the wounds has come. The moment to bridge the chasms that divide 
us has come. 
Never, never and never again shall it be that this beautiful land will again experience the 
oppression of one by another and suffer the indignity of being the skunk of the world. Let 
freedom reign. The sun shall never set on so glorious a human achievement!” – extract from 
Nelson Mandela’s inaugural speech as President of South Africa, Pretoria, 10 May 1994.  
"We are extricating ourselves from a system that insulted our common humanity by dividing 
us from one another on the basis of race and setting us against each other as oppressed and 
oppressor. That system committed a crime against humanity." – extract from Nelson Mandela’s 
speech in Pretoria upon receipt of a report from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, 





These quotes from Nelson Mandela, who is often referred to as an international icon 
(Department of Sport and Recreation, 2013), are important. They place into perspective the 
value of sport as a nation-building instrument. The quotes illustrate very briefly the political 
journey of arguably one of the most influential politicians to ever lead South Africa. The first 
quote was delivered during the Rivonia treason trial where Mandela and his co-accused 
activists against apartheid stood trial, accused of sabotage.  
This trial was often referred to as “the trial that changed South Africa”. Nelson Mandela was 
sentenced to life in prison at the end of the trial. He was released in 1990 from Pollsmoor 
prison. In 1994, in the first fully democratic election held in South Africa, Mandela was elected 
as the first democratically elected president of the Republic of South Africa. He was the first 
non-white president of South Africa.  
Mandela’s aim was to build a unified nation and cross the divide that the apartheid regime 
created. During the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, held in 1998 to investigate 
apartheid-era atrocities, Mandela ended his speech with the following words: “Free at last, we 
are all masters of our destiny. A better future depends on all of us lending a hand - your hand, 
my hand.” At that time, Archbishop Emeritus Tutu, coined the phrase “Rainbow Nation”, 
referring to the many cultures and diversity that exists in South Africa. Tutu used the phrase to 
promote harmony among citizens of South Africa, using the analogy of a rainbow which brings 
all different colours together. The colours never lose their individual identity and yet still the 
rainbow exists as a unit (Archbishop Emeritus Mpilo Tutu, 2016). 
Apartheid not only divided a country. It also separated demographic groups within South 
Africa from certain sports. Historically, rugby has been seen as a white sport. This means that 
non-whites within South Africa were denied facilities and equal opportunities to play the sport, 
compared with the access that white people had to rugby in South Africa. In those conditions, 
how could the sport serve as a vehicle for reconciliation and increased social cohesion in a 
country wrecked by civil conflict? This research analyzes the case of South Africa and its 
experiences in the sports sector since the fall of apartheid. It does this in an attempt to explore 
the necessary processes to understand the potential that sport has to facilitate peace-building.  
By identifying and analyzing initiatives in South Africa used at the national, community and 




in divided states. By linking experiences from state policies, non-governmental organization 
(NGO) activities and donor projects with social identity and reconciliation theory, the article 
outlines the possible positive and negative aspects of sports. Finally, the research suggests 
important avenues for further research to uncover how to turn sports into effective political 
tools for post-conflict peace building.  
The Transformation Charter for South African Sport (2011) defines transformation as “a 
process of holistically changing the delivery of sport through the actions of individuals and 
organizations that comprise the sport sector to ensure that there is increased access and 
opportunities for all South Africans, that the socio-economic benefits of sport are harnessed, 
and that the constitutional right to sport is recognized” (Department of Sport and Recreation, 
2011).  
Nelson Mandela used sport as a means to bring people together. He believed that sport can 
cross social and political divides that politicians would not be able to cross. The Rugby World 
Cup 1995 is a perfect example of how Mandela used sport to build a nation. Traditionally, 
rugby in South Africa was synonymous with Afrikaner oppression. The way Mandela 
embraced the national rugby team during the tournament was seen as a symbolic gesture of 
reconciliation (Heere et al., 2013). The image of Mandela wearing Springbok captain Francois 
Pienaar’s jersey gained huge support amongst the Afrikaner community. That act helped to 
create a sense of national identity and pride throughout the entire country (Migozzi, 2010).  
SARU described the failure to transform as the “number one critical risk to rugby in South 
Africa” (SARU, 2014). SARU’s Strategic Transformation Plan shows that in 2014 16% of the 
Springbok team was ‘black African’. The plan sets a target of 60% ‘black African’ 
representation by 2019 (SARU, 2014). The transformation plan not only aims to increase black 
representation at player level, but also aims to increase black coaches and referees involved at 
provincial and national level to 50% by 2019 (SARU, 2014). 
While it is vitally important to transform the game, it is as important to achieve success on the 
field. It is this success that attracts sponsors and spectators. The revenue streams generated by 
television broadcasting rights alone in South Africa have increased from  
R182.6m in 2008, to R653.9m in 2016. Sponsorship in SARU has increased from R146.8m in 
2008 to R390.5m in 2016 (SARU, 2015). These numbers highlight the undeniable fact that for 




quality of the product is not compromised in the process – this will negatively influence the 
revenue generated by sponsorships and broadcasting rights.  
The current Minister of Sport, Fikile Mbalula, has expressed his dissatisfaction with the lack 
of transformation in South African sport. In 2016, Mbalula banned all federations, including 
rugby, from hosting international events (Ngoepe, 2016). The ban provoked negative reactions. 
New Zealand journalist Mark Reason wrote that “transformation is damaging South African 
rugby by turning it into a second-rate sport” (Reason, 2016). While the unions, sponsors, 
broadcasters and the players’ union all support transformation (SARU, 2014), it is extremely 
important that the commercial product is not regarded as second-rate because of 
transformation. 
 
1.5.3.  Players leaving South Africa to play overseas 
	
A growing number of high profile players are currently playing professionally in Europe and 
in Japan. In the new Super Rugby format, South Africa has six teams representing the country 
in the competition. Each squad comprises 35 players, which allows for a maximum of 210 
players playing at the highest level of rugby in the southern hemisphere.  
In 2010, South Africa had 472 915 male rugby players. Of these, 84 522 played senior rugby 
(Lambert & Durandt, 2010). This is 67% more senior male players than in New Zealand and 
56% more senior male players than in Australia. While the figure includes amateur and 
professional players, it is reasonable to conclude that with only 210 places available for South 
African players in Super Rugby, a large number will play overseas.  
In 2013, 233 players were playing for overseas clubs. That is 23 more players than we have in 
South Africa playing at the same level (Steyn, 2014). The number of Springboks playing 
overseas has increased from 27 in 2009 to 46 in 2014. This represents an increase of 30% of 
the 46 Springboks who played at least one test during the 2014 season; and 28% of those who 
played a more than 50 test matches during their careers (Steyn, 2014).  
In addition, in 2014, more than 58% of the Springboks playing overseas were part of the 
Springbok team. This will negatively impact on the commercial product sold to the public, 




negative impact it has on the product can also be explained by discussing the impact of losing 
high profile individuals and the loss of the “celebrity” linked to the sport. 
 
1.5.4  Celebrity management in rugby 
	
Celebrity refers to a social actor who maintains the ability to generate a significant amount of 
public attention and prompt positive emotional reactions from stakeholder audiences (Williams 
& Chinn, 2010). I will be focusing my research on celebrity management in the professional 
sports industry, and especially in the context of professional rugby in South Africa. It is 
important to establish the power of the celebrity and its relationship with the sporting brand. A 
number of studies have been conducted into celebrity management and the role of celebrities 
in sport. Celebrity role models have been shown to play a significant role in the aspirations of 
young adults, and have been known to influence consumer behavior (Dix, Phau, & Pougnet, 
2010).  
When individuals gain celebrity status they wish to sustain it, even if doing so might lead to 
conflict between the brand and the celebrity. This is an important point in relation to research 
into the relationship between the celebrity and the brand. Associative learning within celebrity 
management and the brand suggests that by repeatedly pairing the brand and celebrity, each 
become part of the other’s association set (Dix et al., 2010). The questions to be explored with 
associative learning are what impact will a big name celebrity have on the brand; how it will 
affect the identity and brand equity; and whether this would have a negative association for the 
brand. 
Celebrity endorsement in sport is a large-scale business. Nike spent $1.4bn in the period 2003 
to 2004 (Shuart, 2007). There are risks to the brand when endorsing a high profile celebrity: 
the celebrity may act in a way that damages the brand’s reputation by association. Examples 
could be the damage caused to brands when Tiger Woods’ infidelity was exposed (Callahan, 
2013) and when Lance Armstrong was found guilty of doping in cycling, despite having built 
up a respected brand after beating cancer to be the most successful road cyclist in history 




The definitive link in the supporter’s mind between the celebrity player and the affection for 
the team underlines the risk to the financial stability of the sporting team when teams lose high 
profile players; or when they engage with celebrity athletes, as described above.  
The Sharks Super Rugby franchise lost the following celebrity players during the 2015/2016 
rugby seasons: 
• Jannie Du Plessis 
• Bismark Du Plessis 
• Marcell Coetzee 
• Francois Steyn 
At the time of writing, the four international players had accumulated a combined 230 test caps 
for South Africa. During the same period, 16 Sharks players held 473 test caps between them. 
Losing four players with a combined 230 caps amounted to a loss of 49% of the Springbok 
caps in the entire Sharks Super Rugby squad.  
The loss had a significant impact. Not only did the Sharks fail to make the play-offs that year, 
the season tickets sold in 2016 declined from 10 620 in 2015 to 9 160 in 2016.  
The celebrity value of the players who left can be illustrated though their social media presence. 
Du Plessis, Du Plessis, Coetzee and Steyn had a combined Twitter following of  
137 600 followers. In 2016, The Sharks had 135 900 followers on Twitter – slightly less than 
the combined following of the four players. It is difficult to determine the precise economic 
impact of the players leaving. However, in my opinion it is safe to assume that this negatively 
impacted The Sharks’ brand and most probably the club’s revenue. 
Drucker (1994) argues that sport heroes are merely pseudo heroes and that contemporary media 
has created an unending stream of celebrities (Drucker & Cathcart, 1994). In a study titled 
Heroes in Sport, Joshua Shuart found that sports hero worship is still prevalent (Shuart, 2007). 
The Sharks example laid out above leads me to assume that the loss of celebrity athletes in a 
sporting franchise does impact negatively on the revenue of the business, this can be proven 
due to the decline in revenue if ticket sales and match day revenue. 
The opposite effect is also possible if the influx of celebrity athletes into a sports team impacts 




France’s Toulon Rugby Club, Rugby Club Toulonais (RCT), was founded in 1908. It has a 
rich history in French rugby. Despite the club’s history, RCT was relegated to the second 
division of French professional rugby in the early 2000s. During the 2006–2007 season, Toulon 
businessman Mourad Boudjellal bought the club while it was still in second division. 
Boudjellal had a vision of reaching the Top 14 again and implemented an ambitious recruitment 
plan that was at that stage unheard of in the ProD2 (Toulon Rugby, 2016). Celebrity athletes 
like Sonny Bill Williams, Bryan Habana, Jonny Wilkinson and many more top international 
players were recruited. The effect on the match results were just as impressive as the effect that 
the celebrity athletes had on the brand. RCT’s Facebook following at the end of 2016 was 432 

















My research is centered around professional rugby in South Africa, with the ultimate aim of 
creating a business model that will develop South African rugby franchises into inclusive and 
successful businesses, using The Sharks (Pty) Ltd as the principle case study.  
This review aims to cover the three main areas identified in the conceptual proposal, namely: 
• Transformation 
• Rugby as a business 
• Player exodus 
	
 
FIGURE	1: Venn diagram literature review	
 
The aim of the literature review is to provide a full appreciation of previous work that can 




particular needs to transform and be more representative of the South African population 
demographics (Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011). Historically, rugby is said to have 
excluded people of colour from participation (Department of Sport and Recreation, 2013). This 
will require researching literature to ascertain on the effects that isolation had on South African 
sport. 
While the financial difficulties currently facing the professional game in South Africa have 
been documented (News24, 2016), this review will also examine what, if any, literature exists 
around the financial models of professional rugby.  
The third area that will be researched and reviewed is the problem of top South African players 
leaving the country to play professionally abroad. This is a relatively new phenomenon and, 
although there are media reports on this, there is a paucity of literature which investigates both 
the causes for the exodus and the impact it will have on rugby in South Africa (Burnard, 2015). 
It must be noted that not all the literature relevant to the research has been included in the 
literature review. I have chosen the 15 most appropriate items which include research 
documents, published literature, journals and press articles. My learning portfolio lists the full 
range of literature in the form of books, interviews, articles and other documentation that will 
assist with my research. I have found that the availability of literature depends on the specific 
area of research. As mentioned earlier, currently little has been written on player exodus and 
models for rugby as a business. However, transformation in sport, and more specifically rugby, 
has been extensively documented in various publications.  
The structure of the review will follow a sequential approach. It begins with the literature 
pertaining to transformation in rugby, followed by literature available on player exodus, and 
finally, literature relating to rugby as a business.  
I formulated a mind map, depicted in Figure 2, to help identify the most important sub-areas 
within transformation, rugby as a business, and player exodus. I did this to determine the most 
relevant literature within my chosen portfolio. The seven sub-areas identified will then be 








Figure 2: Literature review, sub areas 
In Figure 3, I have illustrated the relevance of the seven sub-areas, and linked them to the 
appropriate item of literature or writer. 
	




Figure 3 shows the relationship between each sub-area and a specific article. This was a 
valuable exercise in assessing the importance of the article and its relevance to the research. 
	
Figure 4: Literature review, impact 1 
	
	





The tables illustrated in Figures 4 and 5 above aim to show the relevance and the impact of 
each piece of literature to the research. The positioning of the individual items in the quadrant 
on the graph illustrates the level of impact and the value that I judge the author and article to 





Transformation in South African sport is a topical subject, and extensive research and literature 
on the subject is available. Transformation forms a part of both the country’s past as well as 
the future of all sports in South Africa. Smiles (2012) uses South African sporting history to 
illustrate the complexity of sport in the local context. Of particular interest are the suggestions 
that Smiles offers on how to restructure South African rugby at all levels. His article points to 
possible syntheses between transformation initiatives that are driven by merit and those driven 
by political intentions.  
Cupido (2014) focuses more on the transformation policies that have been implemented in the 
Western Cape. While he claims that the Western Province Rugby Football union (WPRFU) 
managed to successfully change the demographics of the organization, in my opinion this 
statement is not objective. My opinion is based on the fact that the Western Cape is a traditional 
stronghold and regarded as the birthplace of coloured rugby in South Africa. The first coloured 
rugby union was established in the Western Cape in 1886. I maintain that Cupido could have 
drawn a comparison with a province in South Africa where rugby was not historically a 
stronghold among players of colour.  
It is necessary to use quantitative data to assess how the numbers of black and coloured players 
have increased - particularly since 1995. Du Toit (2013) quantifies the playing time and playing 
numbers of different race groups between 2004 and 2012. His results demonstrate that 
specialized programmes that SARU has implemented have not had the desired effect on the 
game. He further concludes that until the inequalities in society are addressed, transformation 
programmes are unlikely to achieve the desired outcome, which is that the game of rugby is 




In a 2012 study, Parker (2012) investigates the factors associated with ‘success’ among South 
African rugby players using interviews conducted and collating quantitative data from between 
1987 and 2008. In its conclusion, the study proposes that development and transformation 
should be implemented at a much younger age to ensure maximum results and to provide young 
players the best opportunity to succeed in professional rugby. This is an interesting proposition 
as it proves that the U18 Craven Week – which has always been identified as the breeding 
ground for future Springboks – might be too late in terms of talent development. 
Controversially, Hoskins (2014) argues that black players in South Africa do not develop 
beyond a certain level. He points out that at grassroots level there are more black players than 
white players participating in rugby, but that this is not reflected at senior professional level. 
Hoskins addresses a problem that is well documented in current literature, but offers very little 
in terms of a solution to the problem. 
The relationship between funding and transformation needs to be considered.  
Strydom (2015) aims to establish how funding models can affect a team’s performance. He 
states that the quantitative research conducted for his study does not reveal a clear correlation 
between funding models and team performance. However, his qualitative research process 
points to the opposite. The participants agreed that funding plays a vital role in the success of 
National Sports Federations. Clearly, further research in this area is necessary to propose how 
sustainable funding will affect transformation in rugby in the long term. 
In “The Race to Transform” Aswin Desai explores different sports in South Africa and 
challenges the notion that sporting events ease racial tension. Instead, he chooses to frame the 
debate around sport as a means of social transformation (Desai, 2010). Desai uses the only 
predominantly black club in KwaZulu-Natal’s premier league – the Jaguars – as his case study. 
He points out how players from Jaguars were lured to play for other clubs with few players of 
colour so that those clubs could meet transformation targets prescribed by government. These 
actions resulted in tension between Jaguars and clubs who approached their players. 
Interest in the issue of transformation of sport in South Africa and the history of apartheid 
reaches beyond the linguistic borders of the country. Migozzi (2010) writes a publication 
entitled Les Cahiers d’Outre-Mer. In it, he examines rugby in relation to its history and culture 
and examines its social impact in South Africa. Miggozi also outlines the importance 




included in the literature review to demonstrate that there is international interest in South 
African rugby. 
I found two articles to be the most valuable in terms of my research. These were “Tracing the 
development of professionalism in South African Rugby: 1995-2004”, written by Bolligelo 
(2006), and “Rands for Rugby”, written by Grundling (2005). Both these articles cover the 
three sub-areas identified in Figure 2 on page two in this review. These are transformation, 
rugby as a business and player exodus. 
Grundling (2005) documents rugby’s history from its beginning, during the apartheid era, and 
explores the political pressure the sport experienced then and is still experiencing today. He 
provides detailed information on the process of rugby’s development from an amateur sport 
into a fully professional sport. He also describes the nature of sport and explains that all 
stakeholders have their own unique interests in the game which can vary over a given period 
(Grundlingh, 2005). 
For his dissertation Bolligelo (2006) also researched rugby’s transition from amateur to 
professional status, with a focus on the period 1995 to 2004. He not only examines the game’s 
history, but also identifies contemporary threats and opportunities, focusing on the tensions 
between transformation and professionalism. In particular, I found the chapters on 
commercialism, as well as one outlining the impact of professional rugby on the individual 
players to be stimulating. Bolligelo also writes about “Shamateurism” - the period in which 
players were paid while the game was still supposedly amateur, which signaled the unofficial 
onset of professional rugby. 
 
2.3. Rugby player exodus 
	
The phenomenon of players leaving South Africa has been an issue since rugby officially 
turned professional in 1995. With a depreciating rand, the lure of the pound, the euro and the 
yen has proved to be the principle motivating factor for more and more players choosing to 
leave South Africa to play professional rugby aboard. The Sharks (Pty) Ltd Chairman Stephen 
Saad said in 2016, “It’s also important to consider that in December 2013, the rand-dollar 
exchange was eight to one, and today it’s over 14. Our player base face offers in euros and yen, 




or you can work smarter. We’ve had to do that, and we’ve looked at our youth and development 
programmes.” (Lewis, 2016).  
 
Saad’s statement alludes to the problem. My literature review shows that there is little known 
research to address this phenomenon. In 2009, 236 South African players were employed by 
leading overseas clubs (Steyn, 2014). By the end of 2015 that number had increased to 280, 
with another 45 top players signing to play overseas after Super Rugby 2016 (Nel, 2016a). 
SARU is well aware of the threats to the domestic game and in 2016 concluded contracts with 
20 players in the current Springbok squad to keep them in South Africa (Burnard, 2015). 
There is currently little research done on player movements. Because of this, in my research I 
have relied on statistics of players playing abroad as well as newspaper articles and press 
releases from the club or province informing supporters and stakeholders that the player is 
moving abroad. 
 
2.4. Rugby as a business 
	
The three documents cited in this section of my literature review provide statistical data, which 
is mostly qualitative data collated into reports. This data is important for my research and for 
producing information and trends to help formulate a business plan for rugby as a sustainable 
business.  
The Repucom analysis provides information on The Sharks (Pty) Ltd, which is the case study 
for my research. It provides an insight into the make-up of The Sharks supporter, providing 
information such as age, language and living standards measure (LSM). This will be valuable 
information to consider when constructing a business plan. It will also be useful in 
understanding the demographics of the specific population groups The Sharks should focus on 
to increase their supporter base (Repucom, 2015a).  
SARU’s income statements from 2008 to 2016 are collated into a spreadsheet, to provide 
insight into the governing body’s financial status and how it allocates funds to the provinces 
and franchises. This information will be used as a guideline to how SARU increased or 
decreased spending and revenue in key areas, including broadcasting rights, development and 
player salaries. These figures will enable me to draw a correlation between the financial health 




In 2014 Gerhard Steyn, financial controller at SuperSport, delivered a presentation entitled 
“Ensuring quality in challenging times” to SARU on behalf of The Sharks. The presentation 
contains factual information that covers three key areas: viewership numbers and trends, 
stadium attendances and financial considerations, including broadcasting revenue (Steyn, 
2014). There is a direct correlation between these areas and the revenue of a professional rugby 
organization. I will endeavor to research and collect as much additional data as possible, but 





Sports offers many unique and different ways to articulate national identities, opening up a 
broad spectrum of rituals that create a sense of union and national cohesion (van Hilvoorde, 
Elling, & Stokvis, 2010). As discussed in this chapter, the research noted above and other 
literature available but not cited in this literature review, makes it clear that sport does influence 
national pride. The important question when it comes to a sport like rugby, which was 
historically seen as a white-only sport, is how to successfully transform the player and the 
supporter of the sport while still being a successful commercial business? 
Throughout the quantitative and the qualitative research conducted and the literature reviewed, 
it is evident that transformation throughout the sport at all levels will be paramount to rugby’s 
future success. Rugby’s history is well documented. The notion that rugby is historically seen 
as a white-only sport is unfounded when investigating various articles and literature produced 
on the history of black and coloured rugby in South Africa (van der Berg, 2011). 
Various projects and programmes have been created to develop and transform the sport at 
different levels with limited successes (du Toit, 2013). The present government is placing 
increasing pressure on sport in South Africa to transform and to be representative of the 
demographics of the country. Rugby is taking the subject of transformation extremely seriously 
(Burnard Lloyd, 2016). 
The literature available on transformation shows a number of commonalities, with most writers 
emphasizing the importance of transformation. However, there exist vastly different views 




The need to reconsider the business model for professional rugby in South Africa is highly 
important. I believe that the budget for these programmes should be increased and continued, 
to maintain sustainable transformation and development programmes for rugby in South 
Africa.  
SARU’s financial statements and budgets indicate that 2014 was the last time that the 
governing body of rugby in South Africa budgeted for this item. It has since been omitted from 
the budgets for 2015 and 2016. Further research is required into the reasons for this omission.  
In addition, the financial model for franchises will also need to be examined. It is often reported 
that individual rugby franchises are in financial difficulties. The reason and possible solutions 
for these problems needs to be investigated (News24, 2016). 
It must be borne in mind that rugby is not only a sport of national interest. It is also a major 
business. SARU budgeted R 1.227bn rand as revenue for 2016 (SARU, 2015). The business 
model of South African rugby needs to be urgently reworked to ensure the future of the sport, 
as well as the competitiveness of the national team on the international stage. The player exodus 
from South Africa is damaging the domestic game in the country: too many of our leading 
players are leaving to play their rugby abroad (Burnard, 2015). This poses further risks to rugby 









The current study aimed to identify how it will be possible to develop South African rugby 
franchises into inclusive and successful business models, using The Sharks as the principle 
case study.  
This required an examination of recent financial results through the audited financial 
statements of the Sharks (Pty) Ltd.  
Structurally, the research was guided by two main components, which influenced the final 
structure of the dissertation: an analysis of the past and present state of rugby in relation to 
business, transformation and player retention; followed by the formulation of an appropriate 
model for the future. For the former, the approach was largely deductive; for the latter, largely 
inductive (see figures below). However, mixed methods were used in both the approach and 
the strategy for both components of the research. Through the deductive approach, quantitative 
data from research reports was collected. This looked at important information such as the 
demographics of rugby supporters (Repucom, 2015b), current supporter LSM and the success 





3.2. Research section one: The current situation 
 
 
Figure 6: Research deductive 
Figure 6 shows the research deductive. In keeping with a deductive approach (O’Reilly, 2009), 
a hypothesis based on the existing state and past history of rugby franchises was formulated 
and tested through the gathering of data. The deductive process was therefore driven by a 
quantitative strategy, with data from the statistical records and research reports mentioned 
above, supplemented by qualitative information derived from interviews, and historical and 
autobiographical accounts, used to test and confirm the initial hypothesis based on the current 
































































































to be investigated to support the assumption that they can be more effectively managed, 
financially in particular, for the benefit of the sport and its stakeholders.  
 
During the process undertaken during this stage of my research, several semi-structured 
interviews were conducted to formulate a view with regards to the history of South African 
rugby. The first interview was with John Smit, ex-Springbok captain and former Sharks CEO, 
as he had experience in successfully captaining the Springboks during a career in which he was 
capped 111 times for his country (Greenaway, 2009).  
 
The second interview done during the first section was with Graham Abrahams, Director of 
Enterprises and Regulatory Affairs at SuperSport. Abrahams is known among the rugby 
fraternity for his knowledge of the history of rugby in South Africa, and especially among the 
coloured and black communities. The input provided by Abrahams was extremely valuable 
and confirmed the information gathered from research into existing literature in this specific 
area.  
 
The third interview was with Gerhard Steyn, Financial Controller at SuperSport, Steyn 
provided through his experience as financial controller of SuperSport, in-depth knowledge of 
the financial landscape in rugby in South Africa, and the current financial positions of rugby 
franchises in South Africa. 
The data collected from statistical records and research reports were compiled through a 
collaboration with research agency Repucom, using various methods to determine the 
economic impact of various events. 
 
3.3. Theoretical framework 
 
In the Literature Review process applied during this research, three key areas of literature  were 
chosen: rugby as a business, transformation in rugby and player exodus in rugby. Mind maps 
determined seven sub-areas in the research, and linked to the appropriate text or writer. This 
proved to be a valuable exercise in assessing the importance of each article and its relevance 
to the research. Through this process, which was explained in detail in the literature review, 




methodology applied in conducting their research was evaluated and compared it to the 
methodology for this research. Both writers leaned on autobiographies and biographies to 
provide insights into player experiences and how the sport developed historically and 
professionally. Bolligelo mentions that he found the use of newspaper articles useful in 
providing insights into public opinion. Both writers conducted personal interviews and found 
the interviewee provided significant insight into a specific area of expertise. The methodologies 
used by both Bolligelo and Grundling allowed for a sound grounding for the theoretical 
framework on which this research was based. 
3.4  Research second section: the business plan 
 
 
Figure 7: Research inductive 
	
The second thrust of the research shifted to the development and testing of a hypothesis for a 





















































approach proposed by Saunders and Lewis (2012). The particular information collected for the 
deductive approach was in part be used to formulate a tentative hypothesis, which was then 
tested for validity, before being proposed as a generally applicable theory (Nickerson, 2013). 
Of necessity, the opinions and experiences of stakeholders had to be considered, including 
financial experts, heads of franchises, journalists, and players themselves.  
Two semi-structured interviews were conducted in the inductive research, the first was with 
Edward Griffiths, former CEO, SARFU and Saracens. The commercial and historical input 
that Griffiths brought to the research during the interview was valuable to the research. 
Griffiths was also involved as CEO of Saracens as well as the CEO of SARFU at different 
times. The research pointed out that Saracens was the most indebted club in world rugby at the 
time when Griffiths was CEO. The second interview in this section was with John Swain 
former chairman of The Sharks financial committee, Swain provided historical background on 
the running of The Sharks and provided insights into possible methods that was used in the 
past, and that can be applied in future to establish a business model that will ensure profitability 
of rugby as a business. 
Therefore, the second strategy was largely supplemented by qualitative data, derived from 
interviews, empirical observation gained through my personal experience as COO of a 
professional rugby franchise (of the financial and transformational processes), and relevant 
textual material (media reports and journal articles). I conducted a systematic analysis of the 
data to identify and then codify major themes and recurring patterns and relationships, to 
establish the issues relevant to the formulation of and testing of a hypothesis for the future.   
It is important to note that because The Sharks is the case study for the research, there will be 
limitations to the findings, as in some cases the data to be collected and analysed was related 
primarily to the activities of this franchise only. The data collected was analysed by applying 
value formulas and computer-assisted web interviewing (CAWI) through online surveys. 
	
3.5. Data Analysis 
 
The data analysis was conducted by applying formulas to calculate the economic impact of 




stadium expenditure, for example: casual staff (cleaning, security, bars, DJ) and activations 
(sponsor specific).  
Two main value formulas were used in the calculation of the Total Economic Impact. A 
multiplier was used to consider how the organisational/spectator spending was converted 
within that region. For example, spectator spend on accommodation was then used to pay 
staff, suppliers etc., who in turn purchase goods, and so the revenue was distributed through 
the economy. A conservative multiplier of two (2) was applied to this impact study, meaning 
that for every rand spent on this event, this was then used in only one additional spending 
link.  
The data analysis methodology continued in the Repucom reports used a target market with a 
determined sample size, and a pre-determined LSM and age bracket. The CAWI method was 
used which assisted the web interviewing process and analysed the findings to provide an 




CHAPTER 4: THE SHARKS 
	
4.1 Introduction to The Sharks 
	
The Natal Rugby Union was established in 1890. The team based in Durban was 
affectionately known as the ‘Banana Boys’, referring to the number of banana farms found in 
the province (van der Berg, 2014). With the dawn of the professional era and the 
accompanying financial demands, a long-term strategy was required to build the Sharks 
brand into a global franchise in rugby-playing countries. Although The Sharks name was 
formally accepted in 1995, the strategy really only began to pay dividends from 1996, with 
the allocation of a significant marketing and advertising budget. The Sharks management 
realised the potential power of the brand. An aggressive marketing strategy, coupled with a 
good team, established The Sharks as a brand during the 1990s. 
Professionalism in rugby raised new financial demands and the need to generate greater 
returns for the stakeholders. This has resulted not only in more high-profile international 
fixtures, but also an increase in the fixtures on the domestic rugby calendar — creating an 
ever-increasing threat for event organizers to maintain crowd attendance. In light of this, the 
advertising strategy encompassed the promotion of the whole brand experience, including the 
game, the facilities, the pre- and post- match activities, entertainment and the team.  
In late 1995 the Natal Rugby Union adopted the Shark as its official mascot and namesake 
for the team. Despite limited funds available at the time to establish the brand, The Sharks 
has now become one of the most high-profile rugby teams in South Africa (Repucom, 
2015c).  
The growth of the Sharks brand has received recognition not only in the rugby fraternity but 
also in the marketing industry. Its marketing strategy is acknowledged internationally as a 
trend-setter in  the new era of professional rugby.  
Great courage and vision are required if a team wants to operate successfully in a sport that 
holds strong links to a conservative and traditionalist past. It requires even more to adopt and 
pursue a strategy that many perceive as irresponsible and inappropriate, particularly at the 




Every success story needs driving forces and the Sharks’ story is no different. The Sharks 
prides itself on being professional and led by decisive, visionary people. The Sharks has had 
successful captains take over the union after they retired from playing for the union. Craig 
Jameson, who captained Natal to their first Currie Cup title in 1990, took over as CEO of 
Natal Rugby Union in 1992. John Smit, the 2007 Springbok World Cup winning captain, 
took over from Brian van Zyl as Sharks CEO in 2013. Smit was replaced by another former 
Sharks and Springbok captain, Gary Teichmann, in 2016. 
The Sharks success story would not be possible without sound commercial structures. When 
rugby turned professional in 1995, The Sharks (Pty) Ltd was formed to manage the 
professional rugby body. At the time, its staff compliment was extensively made up of white 
employees. In 2016, the racial makeup of the staff at The Sharks has changed dramatically, 
and truly reflects a transformed structure. It may not yet be the finished product, but there 
have been substantial improvements since 1995. All racial groups are well represented in The 
Sharks’ administration, reflecting the rainbow nation. 
Various stakeholders play an extremely important role in the commercial success of The 
Sharks (PTY) Ltd.	






6. Season ticket holders   
7. Suite holders 
8. Fans 
 
4.1.1  Shareholders 
	
SARU determines that all 14 provincial rugby teams may only have a maximum 49% private 
shareholding. This means that the remaining 51% of the team must be owned by the amateur 




As discussed earlier, the researcher has found that in his experience, the limitation on outside 
shareholding is holding back the growth of professional rugby in South Africa. This is due to 
limited funding, which is directly linked to the fact that majority shareholding vests with the 
amateur leg of the sports. I believe that until this changes, and until South African rugby adopts 
the European model of private shareholding, it will be difficult for South African franchises to 
achieve financial stability and the much-needed competitive edge.  
Currently, the Super Rugby franchises are monopolized by two commercial entities. The 
Sharks (Pty) Ltd, currently has two shareholders: the KwaZulu-Natal Rugby Union (KZNRU), 
at 51% and SuperSport as 49% shareholders. 
The Sharks majority shareholder, the KZNRU, is the governing body for amateur rugby in 
KwaZulu-Natal. It presides over schools, club and development rugby in the province. All 
rugby-playing schools and clubs need to be affiliated to the organization. The KZNRU has no 
commercial value and is a not-for-profit entity. To remain a going concern, the KZNRU relies 
mainly on funds from The Sharks (Pty) Ltd as well as government grants and sponsorships. 
The KZNRU is affiliated to SARU and, along with the other 13 provincial unions, make up the 
president’s council and governs rugby in South Africa (SARU, 2016). 
The other Sharks shareholder, SuperSport, is the current owner of the broadcasting rights of 
rugby in South Africa. The international media, and especially journalists in the SANZAR 
countries, the SANZAR nations are South Africa, Australia and New Zealand(Robinson, 
2014), have questioned the transparency of the process of acquiring the broadcasting rights. 
The Australian rugby union questioned the split between the value of Super Rugby and Currie 
Cup rugby in the broadcasting agreement. The reason for this is that only the portion allocated 
to Super Rugby is divided between other participating countries. At the time of Robinson’s 
article, this was limited to Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Argentina and Japan have 
entered the competition since 2016. 
The value of SuperSport as a commercial shareholder to The Sharks is unquestionable. Apart 
from the value the shareholding offers from an equity point of view, SuperSport also provides 
a valuable communication platform through DSTV to present Sharks-specific television 
programmes to their supporter base.  




running of which is Sharkbite. This is a monthly documentary that shows the day-to-day 
interactions at a professional rugby franchise. It showcases everything from development 
rugby, through to sponsor interactions with the team as well as behind-the-scenes footage of 
the players.  
The second series is called Sharks Gone Wild, a television series in the form of a reality wildlife 
TV documentary, featuring Sharks players. The aim of the programme is to raise awareness of 
and funds to combat rhino poaching and at the same time raises the celebrity profile of the 
players involved.  
The value of the two television shows lies in the fact that they help to enhance the Sharks brand, 
creating loyalty towards and familiarity with the players. The programmes – and the 
commercial relationship with SuperSport – make it more possible to reach fans. Franchises 
with different shareholders do not have that same advantage.  
The financial management section of the three-year plan set out in the attached business plan 
addresses the recapitalization of the Sharks through SuperSport’s assistance. This again proves 
the unquestionable value of a sport-minded shareholder such as SuperSport. SuperSport’s value 
as a shareholder of a professional sports franchise is not only in franchise funding, but also in 
its in-depth knowledge of the sporting landscape in South Africa and abroad.  
Within this arrangement, the one question that will always be asked is whether a potential 
conflict of interest exists between the owner of the broadcasting rights as a shareholder and the 
Super Rugby franchise that competes in the competition being broadcasted. Regardless of the 
argument, SuperSport has shown itself to be a valuable shareholder for the Sharks in the past, 




Sponsors have been a hugely important revenue stream for all sporting franchises. In this, the 
Sharks are no different. Sponsorships make up 38% of income generated by the union.  
The sponsorship landscape has changed in recent times. Greater emphasis has been placed on 




exposure through the association with the sporting brand.  
Several sponsors support The Sharks in different categories. Cell phone network provider, 
CellC has been The Sharks’ title sponsor since 2014. Among other rights attributed to the title 
sponsor, effectively this means that the team is known as The CellC Sharks for the duration of 
the contract. Other sponsor agreements are formed out of individual rights packages ranging 
from cash payments to trade exchange deals, which allows for a sponsor to provide a product 
or a service to The Sharks. For a product or service to be deemed a sponsorship, the important 
criterion is that it should be able to be translated into a rand value for The Sharks.  
In general, sponsorship contracts are usually in place for between one and three years. The 
team’s results often play a role in the sponsorship negotiations. The more successful the team, 
the easier it is to procure sponsors.  
The country’s macro-economic landscape in the country also plays a role in whether companies 
are willing to spend money on sport: a tough economic environment reduces the ability to 
secure sponsorship deals. It is therefore clear to see that sponsorship revenue is a volatile 





The Sharks employees are a diverse group of people that reflects the diversity of the nature of 
a sporting organization. The different departments within the organization include:   
• Finance 
• Human Resources 
• Commercial and Marketing 
• Stadium and maintenance 
• Legal 
• Medical 
• Catering and Hospitality 




• Digital and Communication 
• Rugby Coaching 
• Retail and Ticketing 
With so many different departments within the organization, it is evident that the staff 
compliment will be a diverse group of highly skilled individuals with vastly different skill sets. 
The success of the organization lies in communicating the values and culture of The Sharks to 




The players contracted to The Sharks can be considered as the biggest asset. The players 
provide the product on the field that generates revenue through tickets sales, suite sales and 
retail sales of replica gear. Players also have a role in generating a secondary source of income 
through higher food and beverage sales on match days. When a team is successful, match 
attendance is high. In this, having the players on the field who generate good match results 
increases the traditional revenue streams in rugby. The business plan shows that traditional 
revenue streams are declining. Season tickets and suite sales have been on a steady decline 
since 2014 and the trend seems likely to continue in the short term.  
With this in mind, it is important to source different revenue streams through new and 
previously unused avenues.  
Through their celebrity profiles, players available to the union can be used to generate revenue. 
High profile players are often referred to as celebrity players. The right celebrity player will 
make the sporting brand he is linked to more attractive to both sponsors and fans. This will not 
only lead to higher revenue streams. It will also enhance the team’s marketability and profile 
– particularly on non-traditional platforms like social media. The enhanced profile will allow 
for greater exposure for sponsors and other stakeholders alike. The only challenge is to 
monetize these platforms without damaging the trust of the fans – particularly within a social 
media environment. There is merit in conducting further research into how a sporting team can 





4.1.5 Inter Companies 
	
The Sharks has three Inter Companies, that have outside shareholding but where The Sharks 
holds the majority shareholding. They are separate entities that are created for profit.  
The three companies are:   
• The Sharks Academy (TSA) 
• Sharks Medical 
• The Sharks Kitchen (TSK) 
 
The Sharks Academy was created to produce players who will be able to represent The Sharks 
at the highest level. The Sharks Academy has on average 250 players per year, aged between 
18 and 21. The Sharks Academy is a profit-generating entity. Students are either on bursaries 
or pay fees to the Academy. The Academy’s profit can be attributed to the help and facilities 
offered by The Sharks. Without the naming rights and the link to The Sharks brand it would 
have been extremely difficult for the Academy to attract the numbers and quality of players to 
the Academy. All the facilities are also offered to the Academy at no charge which helps to 
make the entity profitable. 
Sharks Medical is an on-site medical practice serving the public from within the precinct of the 
stadium. The public is attracted by the notion that they will be treated by the medical staff of a 
top sporting franchise. The reality is that the practitioners at Sharks Medical are linked to The 
Sharks, but this link is through the Academy and the junior Sharks teams rather than the 
professional team. The Sharks generates revenue from renting the premises to the medical 
practitioners; and has the added advantage to have a full medical practice on site at the stadium 
in the event of any emergencies. In terms of the viability of the medical center, the question is 
whether the advantages of having a medical practice outweighs the possible threats to the 
Sharks brand of any potential medical malpractice. 
Sharks Kitchen was formed in 2015 to monetize catering on match days. This has historically 




days, as well as 300 hospitality suites that potentially require catering. The reality is that not 
all the suites are subscribed and current suite owners have historical relationships with their 
own preferred suppliers  
The nature of rugby matches, and an irregular events calendar at the stadium pose an additional 
challenge to The Sharks Kitchen: staffing. The Sharks Kitchen hires on average 160 casual 
staff per match. Staff costs are very high, staff turnover is high and it is also difficult to control 
the quality of the casual staff.  
The Sharks Kitchen operates from a purpose-built kitchen at the stadium. This asset should be 
used more regularly to make it profitable and to justify set up costs involved in creating the 
kitchen. Currently The Sharks Kitchen provides lunchtime meals to Sharks Academy students 
and to the senior team. But these meals do not generate revenue for The Sharks: they are 
deemed to be a service, which is a cost to the union.  
On average, The Sharks play 17 home matches per season. It makes no commercial sense to 
support a catering company to operate only on 17 trading days. The challenge for the Sharks 
Kitchen will be to create revenue opportunities outside of the home matches, and outside of 
the catering offered to senior and academy players. 
 
4.1.6 Season ticket-holders 
	
Season tickets are not just an important source of revenue to The Sharks. They represent an 
extensive fan marketing database that could create new revenue streams. That said, the number 
of season ticket holders has been declining in the last few years. In 2016, 9 634 season tickets 




Suite-holders are made up of businesses ranging from small to medium enterprises up to listed 
companies. Companies often hire a suite to entertain clients or to reward staff. Suites have also 








Supporters are arguably the most important stakeholder for The Sharks. It is important to treat 
supporters with respect and communicate with them efficiently. The supporter, whether a 
season ticket holder, suite holder or a follower on a specific social media platform, should be 
seen as a valuable marketer for the franchise. It is therefore very important to communicate 
with supporters constantly to ensure that they know the values and the culture of the team and 
the organization. 
4.2. Competitor Analysis 
The three-year plan was formulated in response to a short- to medium-term strategic business 
analysis. The analysis considered The Sharks’ positioning within the marketplace and then 
provided a business strategy to support a sustainable business. This comparison between 
competitors is extremely valuable as it provides an industry analysis and a competitor 
breakdown to determine where The Sharks is positioned within the marketplace.  
Within South Africa, The Sharks compete with the following Super Rugby franchises: 
• Western Province 
• Blue Bulls 
• Lions 
• Cheetahs 
• Eastern Province Kings 
A brief look at each individual franchise will help to formulate a view on the current state of 
rugby as a business in South Africa. While rugby is currently the most successful national sport 
in South Africa after winning the World Cup twice, in 1995 and again in 2007 (Hoskins, 2014), 
the business behind the sport is not necessarily healthy.  
• The Sharks was featured in the press in 2016, when a former CEO, Brian van Zyl, 




dire financial position, and insisted that the financial statements of the commercial 
company be made available to the public (Van Zyl, 2016).  
• In September 2016 the Blue Bulls made a public appeal to fans to support their team in 
the stadium. The article claims that attendance has dropped in recent years. As an 
example, the Blue Bulls administrators were sure that a semi-final home match would 
be sold out. Barend van Graan, Blue Bulls CEO, expressed his concern when only  
11 612 of the 50 000+ stadium capacity had been sold by the Wednesday before the 
semi-final  (Nel, 2016c). This is a clear indication that revenue had declined at the Bulls. 
• The Lions is the most successful South African team in the last three years. It reached 
the finals of the Super Rugby competition in 2016. However, an article published in 
News24 in 2012 claimed that the Lions union was insolvent. The article claimed that 
the total liabilities exceeded the assets by R73m in 2010 (Mseleku, 2012).  
• The Cheetahs, who was Currie Cup champion in 2016, received a R5m sponsorship 
from the Free State government. In an article written in SABC article claimed that the 
funds would go a long way towards easing the union’s financial woes (Letshaba, 2016). 
• In November 2016, Western Province announced that it had applied for and obtained 
an order for the provisional liquidation of WP Rugby Pty. WP Rugby Pty is the 
commercial trading entity of WP Rugby. The president of the WP Rugby union claimed 
that a smaller sponsorship pool, as well as declining gate and season ticket sales were 
some of the contributing factors impeding the financial sustainability of the union 
(Harrison, 2016). 
• The Eastern Province Kings were placed under provisional liquidation in March 2016. 
The economic impact on the union and the players was devastating. SARU had to 
intervene and 36 professional players headed the liquidation order in a bid to recover 
money owed to them by the cash-strapped union (News24, 2016). 
This brief competitor analysis demonstrates that the rugby model in South Africa needs to 
change. The financial pressures, as well as continued pressure from government to transform 
rugby at all levels (Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011), both on the field and in the 

















According to Lawrence and Moyes, a business plan has three primary functions: 
1. To serve as an action plan 
2. To serve as a road map 
3. To serve as a sales tool 
 
The action plan will help bring all the planning and big ideas that went into the iteration of the 
business plan into a simple action orientated document. 
The road map will keep the company on track after starting to implement the action plan. With 
the day-to-day pressure of running a large organization, it is very easy to lose sight of the action 
plan set out in the beginning. The business plan and, more importantly, the road map will help 
to maintain the course. 
The business plan can often also serve as a marketing plan and as a great sales tool. A well-
written business plan will convince people close to you why the business venture will succeed 
(Lawrence & Moyes, 2013). 
The Executive Summary of the business plan distils the entire plan. This is the introduction 
of the document in which the researcher provides a high-level overview of the business plan 
document. 
The ultimate goal with this business plan was to develop an inclusive strategy that will enable 
rugby to become a sustainable business while at the same time ensuring the successful 
development and transformation of the sport at all levels of the organization. It also provides 
an insight into the direction of the research, which is the search for new revenue streams and 
the urgent need for a new business model to sustain and improve the already existing 
development and transformation programmes.  




recent changes as well as identify opportunities and new potential structures and revenue 
streams.  
The Vision is an important tool that portrays the organization’s values and culture. As 
mentioned by Lawrence and Moyes, the business plan can be used as a sales tool. 
Communicating the company’s values and vision will attract the attention of like-minded 
people who will be willing to invest in the business (Lawrence & Moyes, 2013).  
Overview of Sharks Supporters serves as another level of sales and marketing contained in 
the business plan. The graph shows brand strength and illustrates team support of sporting 
teams in South Africa (Frontiers, 2015). The first three teams on the list are all national teams 
and therefore it is accepted that the three national teams have a bigger supporter base than the 
Sharks. The only non-national team that enjoys bigger support than The Sharks is Kaizer 
Chiefs. Founded by Kaizer Motaung in 1970 (Motaung, 2016), Kaizer Chiefs is a soccer team 
based in Soweto with a significant following in South Africa. The Sharks have a similar 
supporter base to the successful soccer team, which proves the strength of the Sharks brand. 
The second page of the overview of Sharks Supporters statistics in the business plan is 
important as a means to show the geographical diversity of Sharks supporters. This is important 
as it proves that even though the Sharks are based in Durban, South Africa, its enjoys support 
across the country. It is interesting to note that there are more Sharks supporters in the Gauteng 
province than in their home province of KwaZulu Natal (Repucom, 2015b). The Avid Sharks 
Fan demographic on the same page shows that, with 56% of black male support, the Sharks 
successfully changed the perceived historical, white-only rugby supporter base in South Africa, 
into a more inclusive supporter base. 
The overview of Sharks supporters provides a summary of the Sharks’ strength as a brand and 
the franchise’s marketing reach. This is important because it is often difficult to value a sporting 
team. The reach and brand strength of a franchise is often used to determine the value of a 
sporting franchise. 
Stakeholders Overview: as shown in the business plan, the shareholding of The Sharks (Pty) 
Ltd is important as it shows what the researcher points out as a flaw in South African rugby’s 
constitution. As the governing body of South African rugby, SARU determines that all 14 




the remaining 51% of the team must be owned by the amateur body, which consists of clubs 
with little to no commercial value at all (planetrugby, 2016). 
In my opinion, the limitation on outside shareholding is holding back the growth of 
professional rugby in South Africa. The reason for this is that the majority shareholding vests 
with the amateur body, which limits funding capacity. I believe that until this changes, and 
until South African rugby adopts the European model of private shareholding, it will be 
difficult for South African franchises to achieve financial stability and the much-needed 
competitive edge.  
As mentioned in the executive summary of the business plan, part of the goal of The Sharks as 
a business and sporting franchise is to create an inclusive business on all levels. When 
considering the breakdown of employees, and in this case, more specifically the administration 
staff at the union, it is clear that The Sharks has transformed at an administration level.  
Revenue: the revenue slide shows the breakdown of revenue streams that make up The Sharks’ 
total income. These streams reflect all the revenue generated from Sharks activities and 
controlled by the Sharks. A significant revenue stream not reflected on this page is television 
broadcasting rights. This is because SARU conducts the broadcasting rights negotiation. These 
negotiations are also conducted in conjunction with the other participating countries in Super 
Rugby. 
The broadcasting rights distributed to the South African Super Rugby franchises increased 
from R14m in 2016 to R31m in 2017. This is a 58% increase in television broadcasting rights 
in one year. In a presentation to SARU in 2014, Gerhard Steyn, Financial Controller at 
SuperSport, points out the fact that broadcasting rights will become increasingly more 
important to the total franchise income. The declining traditional revenue streams make the 
increase in broadcasting rights that much more important (Steyn, 2014).  
The revenue slide also points out the need to create additional revenue streams because suite 
leases and season tickets are declining. Other avenues should to be explored to make the 
business sustainable. It will therefore be beneficial to explore how stadium facilities, social 
media platforms and other avenues can be monetized to create revenue not traditionally 




Three-year plan: the three-year plan laid out on the contents page lists possible ways to 
address the current state of the business in terms of its financial position. It also looks at how 
to curb spending and avoid financial wastage. This will be done by properly implementing risk 
and compliance processes.  
The plan also aims to explore new revenue streams and details the plan of how to maximize 
the new revenue opportunities.  
The three-year plan considers the importance of development and transformation within South 
African rugby, and proposes a sustainable model for its long term success. The plan ends with 
a detailed section on financial management. The business plan will detail a purpose-built model 
which proposes a unique revenue projection model. This model is important to accurately 
project what revenue should be included in the following year’s budget. This is an exciting 
development. The nature of sport means that the on-field results of a sporting franchise affects 
the off-field financial results of the organization. The financial management section of the 
business plan addresses the company’s current financial reality. It will provide a strategy to 
improve the organization’s cash flow and profitability in the medium term, which will ensure 
the business’s long-term viability. 
 
5.2. Elements of the business plan 
 
The following elements of the business plan will be discussed in further detail:  
• Revenue Streams 
• Three-year plan 
• Risk and compliance 
• Stadium eventing 
• Monetizing social media/launch of application 
• Development and transformation 






5.2.1. Revenue streams 
	
The Sharks’ revenue streams are currently broken down as follows: 
• Sponsorships 38%  
• Suite leases 16% 
• Test match 16% 
• Season tickets 8% 
• Functions and beverages 5% 
• Stadium advertisement 5% 
• Retail 4% 
• Stadium naming rights 3% 
• Home match revenue 2% 
• Rental income 2% 
• Marketing 1% 
• Stadium hire 1% 
 
5.2.1.1  Sponsorship 
 
Sponsorship revenue is the largest revenue stream currently available to The Sharks. 
Currently, the Sharks’ five main sponsors are: 
• CellC  
• Kyocera  
• Durban Tourism  
• Fidelity  
• Micromega  
 
In total, 27 different sponsors in different categories support The Sharks. 
In 2016 The Sharks implemented a system to track the return on investment (ROI) on each 




back in a scientific way to the sponsor and to prove the value of the relationship to the 
individual stakeholder. 











Suites are currently The Sharks (Pty) Ltd’s second largest revenue stream, but this has declined 
since 2013. The decline can be attributed to various factors, including, among others, changes 
in corporate governance that prevents companies from entertain clients, albeit that this applied 
primarily to financial services companies. With the economic environment in the country, 
company restructuring and job losses, businesses are finding it difficult to justify spending 
money on a suite while cutting costs in their organization. There has also been a general decline 
in stadium attendances and this has affected suites as well as season tickets. Table 2 shows 










Table 2: Suite revenue 
 
The suite revenue has declined slightly between 2014 and 2016. 
 
5.2.1.3 Test Match 
	
In the last few years, test matches have presented the third biggest revenue stream. It is difficult 
to accurately determine the real economic impact of a test match to The Sharks: many variables 
are involved with a test match at the stadium.  
The first and most important factor to consider is the visiting team that will be playing against 
South Africa at the stadium. SARU demands a hosting fee or a guarantee that has to be paid to 
SARU by the hosting union to secure the right to host a test at the stadium. The guarantee 
depends on the team playing against the Springboks, and ranges from R6 000 000 to  
R12 500 000 for each test match.  
The economic effect of a top international team playing at the stadium is understandably higher 
than that of a lower ranked international team. In 2015, when the Springboks played Argentina 
at the stadium, match attendance was 33 550. In 2016, when the Springboks played the current 
world champions New Zealand at the stadium, the test match was sold out, with a capacity 
crowd of 54 328 in attendance. The quality of the opposition also impacts season tickets and 
suite sales as the test match is included in the offering of both suites and season tickets.  
These variables make it difficult to determine the net effect of hosting a test match. The revenue 
generated from hosting a test was determined through an economic impact assessment to 




economic impact of hosting the All Black test match held at Kings Park in October 2016 was 
R314 950 000. This shows the value that hosting a test holds not only for the organization but 
also for the host city (Nielson, 2016). 
 
5.2.1.4 Season Tickets 
	
Season ticket holders represent the fourth largest revenue stream for The Sharks. A tough 
economic environment and dwindling stadium attendances have led to a large decline in this 
revenue stream in recent years. Season ticket numbers reached a peak in 2009, when 19 280 
season tickets were sold. In 2016, just 9 634 were sold. 
It is important to remember that in 2016 the Sharks season ticket includes an All Black test 
match that would have positively influenced sales. At the time of writing, no test match is 
confirmed for the Sharks in 2017, which will influence the 2017 budget.  





Table 3: Season ticket revenue 
 
Season ticket revenue has showed a steady decline since 2013. 
The revenue streams described above account for more than ¾ of the total revenue generated 
by The Sharks. This revenue excludes broadcasting rights. The remaining smaller revenue 
streams as listed above provides for the balance. The business plan will present a commercial 
model to increase stadium events revenue by including food and beverages. It will be essential 
to ensure new revenue streams to replace the current declining revenue streams. Avenues to 
monetize social media and the celebrity status of the players are currently being explored to 





5.2.2  Three-year plan 
 
5.2.2.1  Risk and Compliance 
	
The first step identified in the business model that needs to be addressed is the implementation 
of a risk and compliance model. This is required to protect the interests of the company by 
ensuring uncertainty does not deflect the endeavor from the business goals. A Red Flag report 
was created to flag the risks as identified by each business unit, assigning a rating to each 
identified risks, as well as implementing correctives measures to mitigate material risks.  
Figure 6 shows a risk rating scale that is used to calculate the rating for each risk: 
 
Figure 8: Risk rating scale 
 
The risk and compliance model is a management tool and will be used to reduce the probability 
of a material financial risk. When the appropriate manager identifies the risk early, it can be 
reduced. The risk weighting relates to the possible impact on the business’s finances. The risk 
model will be known as the red flag report, and will be discussed in the operations committee 
(OPSCO) on a bi-weekly basis. 
The compliance management section will comprise an initial list of all laws and regulations 
that might potentially have an impact on The Sharks. This will include internal policies and 
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1. Risk management 
• The OPSCO meetings where the Red Flag is discussed should be scheduled in 
advance and take place bi-weekly 
• The meetings should be used to identify mitigating controls and resources 
required to manage the identified risks	
 
2. Compliance management 
• Each of the laws and regulations should be allocated to a compliance representative 
or manager, who should ensure that The Sharks comply with the specific laws and 
regulations 
In addition, all staff will be held accountable to ensure compliance with laws and regulations. 
This compliance will form part of each employee’s key performance indicators (KPIs) which 
will be linked to annual increases in future. 
Table 4 sets out a summary of all the laws, regulations and internal policies that may have an 

































Table 4:  Summary of laws and regulations 
5.2.2.2.  Stadium Eventing 
	
The Sharks are based at Kings Park Stadium, which has a capacity of 54 000 seats. In addition 
to the stadium seating, it also includes more than 300 hospitality suites, 10 rugby fields around 
the stadium and numerous venue rooms. On average, the stadium is used for 17 home matches 
every year. Apart from stadium employees and rugby teams training, the stadium is mostly 
unused for the remainder of the year. 
The Sharks owns many underused venues. The business plan includes a spreadsheet of 
scenarios that could generate more revenue, including renting out individual event rooms and 
offering a turnkey solution for corporate functions, birthdays, team building and so on. By 





staff and security we will be able to maximize the profit generated through the eventing 
department.  
As shown on the spreadsheet on page 16 of the business plan, the net profit after costs to The 
Sharks is projected from just over R4m in year one, to almost R5.3m in year five. 
 
5.2.2.3.  Monetizing social media and fan engagement 
	
The Sharks has the largest following of any provincial rugby team in South Africa (Frontiers, 
2015), and is also among the top 10 South African sport bodies on both Twitter and Facebook 
(Repucom, 2015c). Currently, South African sporting teams’ social media following has not 
been monetized to the extent that it provides a regular revenue stream for the organization. In 
addition to its large social media community, The Sharks also has a supporter base whose 
demographics reach beyond the boundaries of Durban and KwaZulu-Natal. The Sharks has 
more supporters in Gauteng than in Durban, with 37% of Sharks supporters living in Gauteng 
and 31% of supporters living in KwaZulu-Natal (Frontiers, 2015). 
At the time of writing, The Sharks is rolling out a digital application that targets loyal fans from 
all across the globe to constantly interact with the organization through innovative content. 
This will not only build stronger relationships with the brand but it will also unlock new 
revenue streams for the organization. Historically, the rugby supporter in South Africa is 
average age 39, 65% male and 33% Afrikaans (Repucom, 2015a). The application will allow 
The Sharks to successfully reach out to a different and younger demographic group.  
Tanya Buckley, head of content at Magna Carta Reputation Consultants says that: “Your brand 
story lives beyond a catch phrase or tagline, it needs to make a connection with people, beyond 
their interaction with your product or service – that’s how you stand out from the crowd.” 
(Wronski & Goldstuck, 2016).  
The application will form part of a fan engagement platform, with a multi-stage approach. 
Stage one will be to reach Sharks fans through rich and interesting content. Stage two will be 
to gain a better understanding of the fans interacting on the platform. Stage three will be to 





to unlock new revenue streams though a payment portal and increase existing retail revenue 
streams through improved accessibility. 
The application can be monetized through: 
• Free download with in-app purchases 
• Sponsorship and advertising sold on the platform to interested outside organizations 
• Merchandise sales through an online store hosted on the application 
• Exclusive content subscription, described in Table 5 below 
 
Table 5:  Revenue from social media 
Table 5 shows the revenue that could be generated by charging a R50 monthly subscription fee 
for Sharks fans to access exclusive content on the application which could include exclusive 
coaching videos, early releases, monthly digital magazine and other options exclusive to the 
member. This creates a potentially significant monthly revenue stream for The Sharks. The 
Sharks currently has more than 500 000 followers on Facebook and Twitter alone (Repucom, 
2015c). Based on the assumption that fewer than 10% of the fans will become subscribers at  
 
Subscription Fee/pm Total App store/Fanhero 50%
Sharks 50% per 
month
5000 50 R250000 R125000 R125000
15000 50 R750000 R375 000 R375000
25000 50 R1250000 R625000 R625000




R50 per month, the annuity income stream equates to R1 250 000 per month and R15 000 000 
per annum to the organization.	
 
5.2.2.5.  Development and transformation 
	
“Sports remains a highly contradictory enterprise that, on the one hand, brings people and 
communities together, albeit for short periods of time…On the other, it divides people through 
its very nature of having winners and losers…The question we must continually examine is 
who are the winners and losers…”(Desai, 2010). 
Although South Africa is a sport-loving nation, its apartheid history excluded non-white 
residents from participating in sport and having access to sporting facilities. Sport has 
historically been seen as a divider rather than a unifier of South African people. As an example, 
in 2015 a legal bid was launched to prevent the national team from travelling to England to 
play in the Rugby World Cup. The applicant argued that government, along with SARU, had 
failed to ensure that the national team reflected the South African demographics. The presiding 
judge, Judge Mavundla, stood the matter down for the parties to discuss transformation in 
rugby (BusinessTech, 2015). 
In the “Transformation Charter for South African Sport” (Department of Sport and Recreation, 
2011), transformation is defined as a process of “holistically changing the delivery of sport 
through the actions of individuals and organizations that comprise the sport sector to ensure 
that there is increased access and opportunities for all South Africans, that the socio-economic 
benefits of sport are harnessed and that the constitutional right to sport is recognized” (Charter, 
2011). The failure to transform is described as the “no 1 critical risk to rugby in South Africa” 
(SARU, 2014). The 2014 Strategic Transformation Plan shows that 16% of the Springbok team 
in 2014 was ‘black African’ and sets a target of 60% black African representation by 2019 
(SARU, 2014).  
It is an undeniable fact that rugby in South Africa is involved in a race to transform. That said, 
politicians and many others in South Africa are questioning the effectiveness and success of 
development and transformation plans within rugby in South Africa. While there are groups 
who believe that transformation has had its successes, many others claim that transformation 




“Four key imperatives underpin SARU’s values: transformation, growth, winning and financial 
sustainability. These are based on the needs of all SARU’s stakeholders and are inter-
dependent. Therefore, success is only possible if all four are equally realised.” (Steyn, 2014).  
The need for a sustainable transformation programme is extremely important for the 
sustainability of rugby in South Africa. The researcher raises some questions regarding 
SARU’s to ensuring the success of the development and transformation of rugby in South 
Africa.  
In 1993, immediately after South Africa’s re-entry to international rugby, SARU committed 
R13m to fund a general rugby development programme in previously disadvantaged areas in 
South Africa (Desai, 2010). That was 23 years ago. At today’s value, in 2016, R13m equates 
to R51 496 343 (*assumptions: R13 000 000 PV, 23 N , 6% inflation I/YR).  
The researcher assessed the SARU consolidated income statements for the period 2008–2016. 
In its 2008 income statement, SARU allocated R101m to fund development. Converted to 
present value in 2016 terms, this equates to R163 028 413 (*assumptions: R101 000 000 PV, 
8 N, 6% inflation I/YR).  
SARU’s income statements show that the budgeted spend allocated for development was 
removed from the budget in 2015 and 2016, with no funds allocated for development funding. 
SARU might argue that the responsibility for transformation and development lies with the 
individual unions and the funding provided to the unions through broadcasting rights should 
be used to fund development programmes. The researcher does not deny that an amount of 
responsibility lies with the individual unions. However, as the governing body of rugby in 
South Africa, SARU’s approach is flawed – and especially so when considering the political 
pressure and the race to transform rugby in South Africa.  
Development and transformation of rugby in KwaZulu-Natal is currently the responsibility of 
the KZNRU. However, the KZNRU is a non-profit organization, and desperately requires 
funding to successfully and sustainably manage development programmes in the province. The 
vision of KZNRU’s development and transformation department is to transform rugby in 
KwaZulu-Natal into a game that is seen to be inclusive of all races, ages and genders, while 





The KZNRU currently runs a successful mass participation programme that reaches 
throughout the province. SARU recognizes the current rugby development programme as an 
outstanding one, and the provincial government also support and recognizes the program. 
The Member of the Executive Council (MEC) of sport in KZN Mrs Bongiwe Sithole-Moloi 
endorsed the programme and the work done throughout the province.  
However, the reality is that with reduced government spending and the increased pressure on 
the private sector, less funding is available. This could compromise the program, which will 
have to be reduced.  
But cutting back on any transformation programme in rugby is not negotiable. A sustainable 
funding model is required, not only to sustain the mass participation programme but also to 
convert mass participation into high performance, and to produce athletes capable of playing 
at the highest level. In the researcher’s opinion, the fact that transformation in rugby has 
historically been the responsibility of the amateur body which has no commercial value, and 
is mostly reliant on government grants and corporate social investment, (CSI) funding is a 
huge risk.  
At a board level The Sharks took a decision to integrate the KZNRU staff onto the commercial 
side of the organization. This will allow provincial rugby development efforts to have access 
to quality staff in areas like finance, commercial and marketing. This will supplement the 
already competent staff who have been employed to roll out the very important transformation 
programmes. While the closer working relationship will alleviate some of the duplicated 
administrative costs, this does not offer a solution to successfully fund the programmes.  
Two areas have been identified as requirements for building a successful development 
programme that will lead to an inclusive sporting brand at The Sharks. 
• Sustainable funding 
• Multi-tiered asset based development programme 
Development funding  
	
The funding will have to be reliable for the programme to be sustainable. The researcher has 
already addressed the volatility and risks related to the practice of relying solely on government 




turnover may be allocated to CSI projects. This allocation will be used for social cohesion 
projects, which will allow for the organization to benefit on their B-BBEE scorecard.  
It should be noted that the proposed model does not discard government grants and CSI 
funding. Rather, the model proposes to move away from the volatility of these income streams, 
caused by possible budget constraints and cuts at government and corporate level. The KZNRU 
is registered as an NPO and it is important that it maintains this status. This allows funding 
from government and from companies seeking to allocate CSI funding to rugby to be channeled 
through the NPO. However, as discussed earlier, a programme of such vital importance to The 
Sharks’ future should not rely on such a volatile revenue stream. 
The researcher therefore recommends that the budgeted amount for the entire programme be 
moved to The Sharks (Pty) Ltd. This will ensure the continuation and the success of the 
development program, as well as creating a sound platform to expand and improve the current 
program. The funding to the development programme will be derived from the allocation of 
commercial rights to sponsors and partners of the development program. 
The Sharks (Pty) Ltd will allocate the following rights to development funding: 
• Hospitality suite 
• Match day tickets 
• Stadium parking 
• Match day promotions 
• Advertising in Sharks Magazine and match day program 
• Big screen advertising 
• LED advertising scroll advertising during matches 
• Player appearances 
• Invitations to Sharks events 
• Exposure on Sharks Super Rugby and Currie Cup match day jerseys. 






Multi-tiered asset based development program 
	
It is proposed that the current programme be expanded into a three-tier development 
programme  
+ Tier 1: Mass participation (current structure)  
+ Tier 2: Asset based community program 
+ Tier 3: Elite development programme  
This will allow for a secure pipeline of quality players that will ensure that more local non-
white players are represented in our provincial teams at different age groups  
Tier 1  
Current programme serving children from 550 schools in 52 hotspots, reaching 16 500 learners 
per annum. This tier is extremely important as it ties in with the government’s goal for mass 
participation.  
Tier 2  
The goal of this tier is to allow the best and most talented players identified in tier one to be 
accommodated in identified schools within each KZN sub-union. Through its development 
committee, The Sharks is in the process of identifying the schools in each sub-union and if 
necessary acquiring the funding options to provide for the boarding facility required at each 
school. A significant advantage of this stage is that it is possible to invest time and resources 
in the individual’s education and coaching and to ensure that he receives the correct nutritional 
support to allow for his ultimate development as a potential professional rugby player.  
Tier 3  
This tier will serve to develop the identified individual and accommodate him into an elite 
player development program. This will be done through two possible avenues, which will be 






• Purpose-built elite center: this will be a facility that accommodates the elite rugby players 
identified in Tier 1 and Tier 2 and will provide life skills, education, nutrition and high level 
skills coaching  
• The goal for the elite center is to ensure that once an individual goes through the Sharks 
Development programme, he will be equipped for a career in rugby as well as successful life 
after sport  
If both the funding and the programme can be structured as outlined in the business plan, the 
researcher believes that it will lead to a successful and sustainable development program. This 
success will the lead to a more inclusive sport within KwaZulu-Natal province while 
successfully achieving the targets set out by government.  
I feel strongly that, more important than merely achieving government targets, this programme 
and the structure of it will ensure quality and the sustainable transformation, growth and 
development of rugby. It will be sustainable because it will allow for the establishment of 
proper rugby structures at school, ward and district level, which will in turn lead to community 
empowerment. The community will be empowered because they will see the pathway created 
for coaches, players, referees and administrators from within their community through the asset 
based community program. The Sharks will also benefit from this programme because it will 
provide quality players, referees and administrators from within the province and it will also 
convert mass participation to high performance. 
 
5.2.2.6 Financial Plan 
	
A sound financial plan will be essential to the success of any professional sporting 
organization. Throughout the world, sporting franchise funding can be divided in two different 
sections. The sporting industry in the world has two operating models:  





Table 6:  State model and market model 
 
The comparison between the state model and the market model can be applied to the South 
African sporting landscape. The revenue from the state model in South Africa is in the form of 
government grants and CSI funding from corporates. The revenue from the market model is 
generated through rights owned by the sports team. 
The quest for new revenue streams throughout rugby is essential to replace the declining 
traditional revenue streams as previously discussed in the business plan. It is important to 
understand the nature of rugby as a business, especially in terms of budgeting and preparing 
financial projections for the following financial year, as well as medium term financial 
planning for the organization.  
Funding received from government and CSI allocations will contribute to the success of the 
transformation and development programmes. That said, as proposed in the business plan the 
responsibility should be transferred to the commercial entity. This will ensure the creation of 
high level sustainable transformation programmes that will provide a legacy both in the form 
of players on the field but also in the communities through the asset-based community 
programme proposed in the business plan. The cost for the development will become a fixed 
cost in The Sharks’ budget, with the revenue being generated through the rights package 
attributed to development and transformation.  
The market approach (Vaczi & Berkes, 2010) is the most appropriate for a rugby franchise in 
South Africa, particularly in the context of the information presented earlier and the unique 
challenges that faces sport in general and specifically rugby in South Africa.  




2.2. Sports Financing 
According to Škorić, Bartoluci, and Čustonja (2012, p. 180) “sport is a complex social 
activity that encompasses various areas. This, of course, complicates the matter of its 
financing since it is financed by private and public sources”. There are various ways that 
countries can fund their individual programmes and each country needs to decide on the 
importance that international events, such as the Olympic Games and Commonwealth 
Games, play within its society and economy. The importance placed on these events 
could determine the level of funds made available to the participating athletes (Binns, 
2009).  
A study performed by Frisby (1986) on Canadian sports federations found that even 
though several factors have an effect on NSFs ability to perform at international 
competitions, the NSFs with larger operating budgets, tend to perform better in terms of 
world rankings. Frisby (1986) further cautioned that the development of high 
performance sports teams cannot be guaranteed by a larger budget, but requires 
resources to be allocated effectively. The allocation of financial resources between 
different funding programmes have been documented and discussed under section 2.3 
of this chapter.  
The financing of sport can generally be divided into two basic sources, being 1) budget 
or public sources and 2) non-budget or specific means. Non-budget funds include 
sponsorships, donations, gifts and other income (Škorić et al., 2012). For the purpose of 
this study non-budget funds have been referred to as “private funding”. 
András (2004, as cited in Vaczi & Berkes, 2010) distinguished between two operating 
models in sport as presented in table 4. The key difference between the two models is 
the source of the funding. The state model is funded by the government, which is the 
case with most of the South African NSFs, and the market model is funded by private 
sources.  
Table 4 The Sport Industry’s Two Operating Models (András, 2004, as cited in Vaczi & Berkes, 2010) 
 State model Market model 
Source of funding Government subsidies Business revenues 
Budgetary constraints Soft Hard 
Owner No real owner exists Real owner exists 
Operating framework Non-profit: public 
association 
For profit: business entity 
Role of sports Reinforcing political 
regime, improving public 
morale 
Providing services as part 






revenue is unpredictable and costs escalate above inflation every year. These are important 
challenges when structuring a financial plan. Being able to accurately predict revenue for the 
coming year within the financial model will allow for expenses to match the revenue, to present 
a break-even or positive budget that can stimulate profit.  
The researcher addressed the state of South African rugby franchises and the financial health 
of the individual business earlier on in the business plan, demonstrating that all the six South 
African rugby franchises have run into financial trouble in recent times. The researcher’s 
simple conclusion is that the financial plan and business model of the teams are flawed and 
that South African rugby franchises expenses exceed their revenue in a specific financial year.  
The reason for this is that there is pressure on teams to perform, and performance for a sporting 
team is measured mostly with on-field results. To achieve the desired on-field results, teams 
aim to recruit and contract the best players and coaches. The economic principle of supply and 
demand applies and the market value of the best players increase more than the franchises’ 
revenues are able to increase. The huge demand on South African players by overseas clubs 
inflate the asking price of a top South African player even more. 
The researcher also believes that there is a correlation between the franchise’s revenue and the 
results of the team during any given year. The team results, combined with the strength of the 
brand and its appeal to sponsor and fans alike all contribute to the organization’s revenue. But 
how can revenue for a rugby franchise in South Africa be predicted?  
Sponsorship revenue is easier to predict than the revenue generated from season tickets, suite 
hire and match day events. Sponsorship revenue is generated through a signed contract between 
the sponsor and the organization. These contracts have a start and end date, and the financial 
consideration is also clearly set out. It is more difficult to predict revenue streams that are 
correlated the rugby offering. This can either be the performance of the team, the change in 
coaching staff and the allocated test match assigned to be played at the stadium. 
In association with Gerhard Steyn, the researcher developed a revenue forecast model to be 





5.2.2.7 Revenue projection model 
	
The objective of the revenue projection model is to determine the factors that influence the sale 
of season tickets. Determining this successfully will help to determine a budgeted season ticket 
revenue for the following year. The model will compare historical season ticket sales for the 
Sharks, and will then look at factors that influence the movements in sales. Figure 7 shows 
season tickets sold between 2004 and 2016.  
 
 
Table 7: Season tickets sold 
 
The factors influencing the sales of season tickets were: 
• International content, which is the test match hosted at the stadium the following year. 
It is more lucrative to host the All Blacks than, for example, hosting Italy. This has a 
direct effect on season ticket prices as the test ticket is included in the season ticket 
offering. 
























also deemed to have a direct effect on ticket sales. The season ticket sales campaign for 
the following year is launched days after the Currie Cup ends and the prevailing 
emotions from a good or bad season affects the sales. 
International content 
 
Table 8 shows a key for the revenue model. It attributes a value for each international team, to 
determine the impact that international content has on revenue streams such as season tickets. 
British and Irish Lions (B&I Lions), is a team made up from England, Ireland, Wales and 
Scotland. The British and Irish Lions tour once every four years. 
 
 
Table 8: Key for revenue model 
 
Table 9 shows the international matches played at Kings Park since 2004, and allocates an 




















In the same way as the international content has been graded, a key was awarded for Sharks 
team performance. Table 10 shows the Sharks’ performance key.  
 






































Each performance was allocated a value according to the key shown in Table 10, to provide a 
total number of points for the Sharks’ team performance during a specific year. This is shown 
in Table 11. 
 
Table 11: Sharks team performance in given season 
 
The next step in the revenue projection plan will be to plot on a graph the total number value 
attributed to each team performance, as well as the international content. The Y axis of the 
graph plots the score, whereas the X axis of the graph plots the number of season tickets, as 
shown in Table 12.  
Year Super	Rugby Currie	Cup Total
2003 4																														 3																										 7																															
2004 4																														 3																										 7																															
2005 1																														 3																										 4																															
2006 5																														 3																										 8																															
2007 9																														 5																										 14																												
2008 5																														 10																							 15																												
2009 4																														 7																										 11																												
2010 3																														 10																							 13																												
2011 4																														 5																										 9																															
2012 6																														 9																										 15																												
2013 3																														 9																										 12																												
2014 6																														 3																										 9																															





Table 12: Combined number 
 
The total number – Internationals and Sharks team performance — is then plotted on the graph 
depicted in Figure 7. 
 












2004 15	310																			 21 7 28
2005 15	550																			 21 7 28
2006 13	418																			 20 4 24
2007 16	831																			 24 8 32
2008 17	062																			 21 14 35
2009 19	280																			 25 15 40
2010 15	773																			 20 11 31
2011 16	555																			 21 13 34
2012 14	812																			 21 9 30
2013 13	953																			 13 15 28
2014 13	959																			 18 12 30






















Although the team’s performance and international content partially explains the increases and 
decreases in the sale of season tickets, another factor is also driving the fluctuations. The 
researcher determined that brand loyalty has an influence on the sales of season tickets.  
A number needs to be added to the previous combined score of the international content and 
team performance to explain a 100% correlation between the annual season ticket sales and the 
score for the factors that influence the sales. This score or number will be called brand loyalty. 
Table 13 depicts this score between the table, team performance and total score. 
 
 
Table 13: Brand loyalty 
 
The researcher’s conclusion is that the fluctuation in annual season ticket sales can be attributed 
to a combination of international content, Sharks team performance and brand loyalty. This is 










It is important to understand brand loyalty and what influences it. I believe that brand loyalty 
is influenced by a number of factors. These could be a change in the competition structure, a 
change of coach, the quality of the squad contracted to the Sharks and the current economic 
environment, among others. Table 14 depicts factors influencing season ticket sales, plotted 
against particular events that took place during the year in question. Based on this comparison, 
















Table 14: Factors influencing sales 
 
Table 14 shows the significant impact these factors have on season ticket sales. Supporters 
have lost confidence in the brand. A number of significant changes in 2016 may have an impact 
on brand loyalty: 
• Change in Super Rugby competition structure 
• Change in Currie Cup competition structure 
• Loss of senior players after a World Cup year. The years 2006 and 2008 saw a drop in 
confidence due to the change in format in 2007 and change in coach in 2008. Change 
of coaches in 2011, 2014 and 2015 shows a negative variance in brand loyalty. 
These factors, combined with the team’s weak performance in the Currie Cup and Super Rugby 
Tournament, will be masked by hosting an All Black test in 2016. If the team’s performance 
does not start improve significantly in 2016, the full impact of these factors on season ticket 
sales will only be felt in 2017.  
Determining the budget for 2017 using the projection model 
	
Assuming the brand loyalty drops by three points as result of the changes to the competitions 






2006 10.42																													 -1.16																														 Super	12	change	to	Super	14
2007 10.69																													 0.27																															
2008 8.25																															 -2.44																														 Change	of	coach	-	Dick	Muir	replaced	by	John	Plumtree
2009 8.62																															 0.38																															
2010 9.12																															 0.50																															
2011 8.02																															 -1.10																														 Super	14	changed	to	Super	15
2012 7.79																															 -0.22																														
2013 7.71																															 -0.08																														
2014 5.73																															 -1.98																														 Change	of	Coach	and	Management




confirmed at time of writing), and repeating the team’s 2015 performance, the numbers will 
emerge as depicted in Table 15: 
 
 
Table 15: Integrating brand loyalty 
 
The drop in international content and poor team performance along with low brand loyalty 
translates to a decline in season ticket revenue since 2014, as shown in Table 16: 
 
















2015 10	993																			 -2	966																				 -3	057	061R									 -3	057	061R		
2016 9	345																						 -1	648																				 -1	698	596R									 -4	755	658R		




It is not difficult to adjust the revenue from for example, season ticket sales, down based on 
the model developed, and accordingly also adjust the expenses to compensate for the loss in 
revenue. However, should there also be a focus on how to address the loss of confidence of the 
supporters in the brand? If brand confidence returns, revenue will return.  
The main aim for The Sharks will be to build the brand value through good performances from 
it team on the field. At the same time, it is important to ensure stability among the coaching 
staff and recruitment of the squad. 
To conclude, in the financial management section of the three-year plan set out in the business 
plan, the revenue will be generated through contractual obligations between sponsors and 
advertisers. The other revenue streams will come from sources directly correlated to rugby. 
The revenue projection model above used season tickets as the basis to explain the design of 
the model. However, it is possible to use the same model to project revenue for other rugby-
related revenue streams. These will be suite sales, retail, match day ticket sales and food and 
beverage sales at the stadium. 
An essential part of the financial management of any professional rugby franchise is managing 
expenses, and the case study around the Sharks is no different. By far, the largest expense items 
are player contracts and team expenses. It is important to formulate a strategy around restricting 
player spend.  
The rise in player salaries is currently exceeding inflation. If these are not kept in check they 
could have serious financial implications for a professional sporting franchise.  
In an interview with John Swain, who was chairman of the Sharks’ financial committee from 
the late 1990s until 2015, Swain proposed a contracting model that the researcher has found to 
be a sound way to budget for player contracting spend. Swain suggested that the organisation 
linked player contract spend to recurring revenue. In the context of this interview, recurring 
revenue is defined as all the revenue streams that are likely to be constant and which can be 
projected for the following year. These included but were not limited to sponsorship revenue, 
broadcasting rights, season tickets, suite sale and advertising revenue. The recurring revenue 
did not include test matches and once-off payments such as bonuses for winning competitions. 
Nor did it include other revenue streams that were considered to be too risky to include in the 




revenue. He recommends that the total rugby budget, including coaches, does not exceed 50% 
of recurring revenue. 
If applied correctly, the value of this model is that the player budget and rugby spend will 
fluctuate with the increase or decrease of revenue. The positive side of this model is that it will 
prevent  the company from spending more than it can afford, which can lead into financial 
difficulties – as rugby organizations have experienced both in South Africa and abroad (Harris, 
2016). 
5.2.2.8  Current reality business plan 
	
From a financial perspective for The Sharks (Pty) Ltd, The Sharks, like the other franchises in 
South Africa, are facing financial hardship. The challenge is to create a business model that 
provides a sustainable financial future for the sport, not only ensuring growth with regard to 
the professional side of rugby, but also ensuring that the model will be able to fund 
development and transformation of rugby in South Africa.  
The Sharks’ finances and accumulated losses were well documented between 2014 and 2016. 
The Sharks board replaced Brian van Zyl, the incumbent CEO, who served the union from 
1994 until 2013, with a young but high-profile former-Springbok captain, John Smit. Smit’s 
profile and lack of experience received extensive press coverage at the time. Smit had recently 
retired from a very successful playing career which had culminated in a Rugby World Cup 
victory in 2007 (Greenaway, 2009). He was appointed to CEO of The Sharks directly after his 
retirement.   
News of financial irregularities broke in the press immediately after Smit took office. He and 
The Sharks board ordered a forensic investigation into the union’s finances and the 
management under Van Zyl (Clarke, 2014).  
The Sharks finances made the press again in July 2016, when Van Zyl asked the union to 
release financial statements of the previous financial year. Van Zyl believed that the union was 
technically insolvent and that the company could no longer be considered as a going concern 
(Van Zyl, 2016). In an open letter written to the media, Van Zyl cited his belief that The Sharks 
had accumulated losses in excess of R60m. He demanded that the financials be released to the 




John Smit resigned in July 2016 and was replaced by Gary Teichmann, who had been 
extremely successful rugby player himself. Teichmann captained both The Sharks as well as 
South Africa with great success (Teichmann, 2000). The difference between Smit’s and 
Teichmann’s appointments was that Teichmann already had an extremely successful business 
and was a respected businessman in his own right.  
The priority of the new CEO and the board, led by chairman and successful businessman 
Stephen Saad, was to address The Sharks’ finances and provide a financial plan for the union. 
The researcher was tasked with providing the plan, in conjunction with a team appointed by 
The Sharks (Pty) Ltd board of directors. The financial plan set out in the business plan reflects 
the final plan presented to and approved by the board of directors.  
 
5.2.3. Financial Plan 
	
The Sharks has experienced financial difficulties during recent times, primarily driven by an 
ever-increasing player budget and decreasing match day attendance and season ticket sales. 
Given the nature of professional rugby, which is the Company’s and Group’s core operation, 
positive cash flows are generated during the rugby season months of February to October each 
year. A plan is in place to improve the profitability over a three-year cycle by reducing the loss 
before tax of R32.7m in 2015 to a projected loss before tax of R4m in 2016, eventually leading 
to a profit before tax in 2019. Table 17 shows a financial summary from 2008 to 2016.  
 
 
Table 17: Financial summary 2008 -2016 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016	-FC
Net	profit/(loss) -2,452,857				 -1,058,537				 -2,748,478		 -2,385,508				 -1,114,437				 -22,925,336	 -7,298,868				 -35,997,883	 -3,975,460						
	-	Interest	paid	
to	Shareholders 19,375,200			 17,222,400			 9,149,400				 9,820,377					 13,939,467			 10,867,874			 8,333,333					 8,333,333					 -																				
Adjusted	
profit/(loss) 16,922,343			 16,163,863			 6,400,922				 7,434,869					 12,825,030			 -12,057,462	 1,034,465					 -27,664,550	 -3,975,460						
Retained	Loss
	-	Opening	
Balance -3,137,501				 -5,590,358				 -6,648,895		 -9,397,373				 -11,782,881	 -12,897,318	 -35,822,654	 -43,121,522	 -79,119,405				
	-	Loss	for	the	
year -2,452,857				 -1,058,537				 -2,748,478		 -2,385,508				 -1,114,437				 -22,925,336	 -7,298,868				 -35,997,883	 -3,975,460						






The key drivers of the plan are to implement strict controls that will reduce the total rugby 
budget to an acceptable percentage of recurring revenue. This would adjust the rugby budget 
to 55% and player contracts to 40%. At the same time, the plan seeks to secure new revenue 
streams. The suggested policy will be phased in from 2017 as follows: 
 
 
Table 18: Proposed percentage spend linked to recurring revenue 
 
Since an annual test match at Growthpoint Kings Park is not guaranteed, the recurring revenue 
is calculated as all gross revenue less gross test match revenue. The projected recurring revenue 
for 2016 to 2019 is: 
                                                           2016             2017               2018             2019 
 





2016 2017 2018 2019
Team expenses as % of 
recurring revenue 67% 64% 59% 58%
Players contracts as a % of 
recurring revenue 51% 47% 43% 42%
Revenue (Gross) 197,763,447 177,918,793 186,689,542 196,799,906 
Non recurring: Test match income 24,013,053   12,475,000   12,885,000   13,335,000   




Revenue is projected to be made up as follows: 
 
Table 20: Projected revenue 2016 - 2019 broken down 
5.2.4. Balance Sheet Recapitalization 
	
The shareholders are committed to the business and have approved the recapitalization of The 
Sharks’ balance sheet. This will be the issue of ordinary shares that will inject R20m into The 
Sharks. SuperSport will effectively acquire an additional 9% shareholding in The Sharks, 
increasing its shareholding from 40% to 49%. KZNRU will remain as the majority shareholder, 
with a 51% shareholding. In addition, preference shares to the value of R20m will be issued to 
SuperSport. The preference shares are equity in nature with no terms of repayment and no 




1) Review and amendment of financial policies and procedures 
• A procurement policy has been drafted and plans are in place to integrate the 
policy with the current accounting system, ACCPAC. The implementation of 
the procurement policy should ensure future savings on the procurement of 
goods and services and will also assist with the procurement element of the  
B-BBEE Act.  
 % of Revenue 2016 2017 2018 2019
   Suite Leases 16% 18% 18% 17%
   Sponsorships 38% 40% 40% 40%
   Season Tickets 8% 7% 8% 8%
   Home Match Rev 2% 2% 2% 2%
   Test Match 12% 7% 7% 7%
   Shark Cage 4% 4% 4% 4%
   Functions & Bev 5% 5% 4% 5%
   Naming Rights 3% 4% 4% 4%
   Rental Income 2% 3% 3% 4%
   Stadium Ads 5% 6% 6% 6%
   Marketing & PR 1% 1% 1% 1%
   Stadium Hire 1% 1% 1% 1%




• Other policies will be reviewed and amended with guidance provided by the 
financial committee. 
 
2) Establish highly effective and knowledgeable audit and finance committees 
• A financial committee is in place, comprising members with the relevant 
backgrounds and expertise. However, the committee should operate in 
accordance with an approved terms of reference (ToR) and meetings should be 
scheduled according to a year planner. Both the ToR and year planner have been 
drafted and are ready for review by the finance committee.  
• An audit committee will have to be established at a KZNRU group level, chaired 
by an independent non-executive member. The ToR and year planner for the 
audit committee has been drafted and is ready for review.  
 
3) Review of monthly management accounts, including cash flow management 
• The monthly management accounts have been amended to include a forecast 
which is used to calculate the projected cash flow balances. The forecast is 
critically important for planning purposes, but it involves the active 
participation of each line manager to provide the Chief Financial Officer (CFO) 
with any material variances, positive or negative, from the approved budget.   
• A formal process will be established to improve the communication of financial 
information between the CFO and line managers.   
 
4) Presentation of timely, accurate and relevant information to ensure effective decision 
making 
• The implementation and improvements document in points 1 to 3 above should 
ensure that accurate and relevant financial information is presented on time. 
 
The business plan above, including the recapitalization plan and the change in shareholding, 
was approved at board level and Stephen Saad, Chairman, Sharks (Pty) Ltd, announced the 





CHAPTER 6: DISCUSSION 
 
6.1 Transformation: What lies ahead 
	
With South Africa’s return to the international sporting arena in 1992, much emphasis was 
placed on sporting administrators to transform South African sport. The world’s eyes were 
fixed on South Africa and politicians and critics scrutinized national teams with few or no black 
athletes.  
South African rugby had the added challenge of breaking the stigma attached to the sport. 
Historically rugby was seen as predominantly an Afrikaner sport. With the success of the 
Springboks and the team’s profile on the international stage, transformation of rugby became 
a political priority for the South African government. Nelson Mandela believed that he would 
be able to reach the white Afrikaner and achieve his goal of multiculturalism in South Africa 
(Pienaar & Griffiths, 1999) through rugby.  
The government did its best to fast-track transformation and political pressure on teams became 
relentless. Minister of Sport, Mr Fikile Mbalula threatened action against sporting teams that 
did not reflect the rainbow nation (Ngoepe, 2016). The government placed much emphasis on 
developing sport in rural areas, with mass participation programmes rolled out across the 
nation. These initiatives would open up rugby in previously disadvantaged areas to create a 
solid base of black rugby players (Desai, 2010). 
The success and impact of these programmes can be widely debated. In reality, even though 
rugby is showing growth at grassroots level, representation at an elite level remains under the 
targets set out by government. The demand for players of colour to be included through all 
levels of the game has had a negative impact on rugby in historically strong non-white rugby 
clubs.  
Jaguars rugby club in KwaZulu-Natal has historically been a powerhouse of rugby in the 
province. Over the years, the club has produced international players like JP Peterson and 




play at the highest level, was also to their detriment. In an interview, Francois Louis, the newly 
elected president of the KZNRU and a long standing Jaguars official, blamed the historical 
white clubs for poaching their best players. Louis added that the white clubs do so to avoid 
investing into developing their own players of colour, finding it easier to poach the finished 
product from Jaguars (Desai, 2010). 
The problem is not constrained to Jaguars in KZN. It is a nationwide problem. In his personal 
experience, the researcher has witnessed the need to have players of colour fast tracked into 
professional teams ruin the lives of the young men involved.  
In just one example, Solly Tyibilika played for South Africa and was the first black player to 
score a try in a test match for South Africa. Born in a township in Port Elizabeth, he was a very 
talented player and was fast tracked into professional rugby. Tyibilika went from not having 
any income to being a highly paid international sportsman. The researcher, who was friends 
with Tyibilika, recalls how he quickly adapted his lifestyle to fit in with his new-found wealth. 
Tyibilika lost his rugby contract due to discipline issues and he was later murdered in a shebeen. 
The tragic incident shocked the rugby world (Capostagno, 2011).  
The researcher found that often a player’s development stops as soon as he is chosen for a 
professional franchise. After studying Solly Tyibilika’s case, the researcher suggests that 
complete transformation in sport will have to be accompanied by a player development 
programme (PDP). This will be especially important if the players do not have the required 
support to cope with the pressures and demands of professional sport and more specifically to 
this case study, rugby.  
The stark reality in South Africa is that 50%, of the population lives in abject poverty 
(Department of Sport and Recreation, 2011). The transformation charter of South Africa states 
that: “The essence of a sport transformation strategy has to be multi-dimensional and focused 
on changing demographic profiles on and off the field of play, ensuring equitable access and 
resource availability, skill and capability development on and off the field play; extensive 
community involvement with a view to provide participation opportunities and to identify 
potential talent; and building and shaping relationships with its future support and spectator 
base, future leaders and decision-makers on the basis of broad-based community engagement. 
This approach will drive and shape sport’s future demographic profile” (Department of Sport 




The Department of Sport and Recreation South Africa (SRSA) is set to invest R1bn per annum 
on sport development programmes for the next three years, from 2013 – 2016 (Department of 
Sport and Recreation, 2013). Governments around the world have different reasons for 
allocating funding to sports. One reason is to elevate national pride (Mitchell, Spong, & 
Stewart, 2012), but another reason is also to deliver on election promises made. The SRSA 
2015/2016 annual performance plan allows for R988.5m to fund their strategic goals (Strydom, 
2015). The goal is driven by the department’s Active Nation programme, a mass participation 
programme to which the SRSA allocated 64% of their budget. The allocation of government 
funding in sport in South Africa contrasts with other countries. In South Africa the focus is on 
eradicating the inequalities of the past, while in other countries the focus is predominantly on 
winning medals to enhance national pride (Luiz & Fadal, 2011). It is clearly evident from the 
SRSA 2015/16 annual plan that the South African government is targeting mass participation 
and transformation in sport (Department of Sport and Recreation, 2015). 
The case of Solly Tyibilika shows that transformation within South Africa should be viewed 
with a holistic perspective: the individual should be respected. While I do not believe that one 
should consider mass participation to be a failure, the true success will lie in empowering 
individuals though sport to become successful South Africans. There is undoubtedly a need for 
mass participation programmes in South Africa. However, I found that for athletes to be 
competitive on the international stage there is a need for development in elite sport.  
The United Kingdom (UK) won 28 medals at the 2000 Olympic Games, after having increased 
spending on elite sport from $A125m per year in 2002 to $A250m per year in 2008. Canada 
increased the spend on elite sport from $A75m in 2005 to $A110m in 2009. Their medals 
increased from 14 medals in 2000 to 18 medals in 2008 (Mitchell et al., 2012). There are 
obvious differences between Canada, the UK and South Africa — the most important 
difference being the levels of inequality in South Africa compared with both Canada and the 
UK. However if the findings in Mitchell’s research can be adapted to the South African context, 
the researcher believes that it is possible to solve the glass ceiling in South African rugby, to 
coin a term created by Oregan Hoskins (Hoskins, 2014).  
Oregan Hoskins served as president of SARU from 2006 to 2016. In his paper titled “The Glass 
Ceiling in Rugby: Tackling the Advantage Line”, he claims that despite the efforts of 
government and SARU to facilitate mass participation programmes in disadvantaged areas 




2014). The lack of black players in our professional teams often evokes anger among media 
and politicians, and SARU has been called to parliament on numerous occasions to explain the 
slow transformation in South African rugby (Parliament, 2011). Hoskins claims that black 
players are found in the lower levels of rugby but the numbers in the national team has shown 
very little growth between the period 1995 – 2014. In 1995 the team included one black player 
and in 2014 three black players. (Hoskins, 2014). 
The school system in South Africa provides a pipeline of quality young players who are 
selected in the provincial schools’ tournament held annually, called The Craven Week. 
Provincial unions and Super Rugby franchises approach the best young talent during this week. 
Young rugby players are offered contracts or bursaries to join the professional teams and are 
then exposed to the elite private academies run by the professional rugby unions.  
Since 2008, rugby-playing universities have joined a competition called the Varsity Cup, a 
tournament played on a Monday night which is televised live on local television. The 
opportunity for exposure on live television leads the universities to ensure that they recruit the 
best available players to ensure success in the competition. The Varsity Cup, along with the 
academies funded by the provincial unions, has created a pipeline of top young talented rugby 
players that provide elite athletes for the provincial rugby teams that feed into our national 
team. The system described above can be compared to an elite development program, held in 
countries like Canada and the UK. The only difference is that the Canadian and UK programs 
are privately funded and don’t rely on government funding. 
South African schools bear the legacy of apartheid policies, with sports such as rugby, cricket 
and swimming maintaining a high white/middle-class profile (Adair, 1995). The majority of 
top rugby playing schools in South Africa are historically white schools and provide the 
majority of national team players (Hoskins, 2014). 
Hoskins mentions that in a recent study of South African schoolchildren aged between six and 
13 showed that there were significant differences in fitness scores and morphology of children 
of different ethnic origins. White children were generally bigger and scored higher in the fitness 
tests than coloured and black children. These differences were largely eliminated when socio-
economic status was improved. (Hoskins, 2014).  
The conclusion that can be drawn from the study used by Hoskins is that, as long as inequality 




provide a pipeline of young top level black players to feed into our professional rugby systems. 
An elite player development programme for young black players is required. As Hoskins 
suggests, if players cannot break the glass ceiling in rugby will suffer adverse consequences in 
South Africa.  
The continued political pressure on rugby will eventually have a negative effect on sponsors 
and stakeholders in the professional game. For sponsors, the association with a sport that is not 
seen as inclusive of the entire South African population presents a reputational risk, and 
sponsors will be reluctant to support the game. Rugby as a business presents an immense 
opportunity. It could create a success story of a sport that once divided a nation, but which 
transformed itself into a fully inclusive nation-building sport that will attract fans and sponsors 
alike.  
 
6.2. The development solution for rugby in South Africa 
	
For rugby in South Africa to be fully representative and to be deemed an inclusive sport in the 
South African context, the glass ceiling preventing black players to feed into the professional 
structures needs to be broken. In the research I have established that: 
• The South African government provides funding for mass participation programmes in 
previously disadvantaged areas. 
• The development of rugby currently lies with the amateur division within the 14 SARU 
member provinces and are mostly reliant on government grants and CSI funding from 
corporates.  
• The school system in historically white areas provides a pipeline of quality players that 
feed into our professional teams. 
• Young white players are physically different from their black counterparts, due to the 
different socioeconomic background of the players. 
• There is a good representation of black players in the lower levels of rugby but numbers 





I used the information at my disposal, as well as my position within a professional organization, 
to provide the following solution to ensure that rugby is successfully developed in previously 
disadvantaged communities. This success will be measured by the number of quality black 
players who get the opportunity to play the sport at the highest level. With more non-white 
players in our professional teams, the demographics of the rugby player in South Africa will 
represent the population of the country. This will ensure that rugby will no longer limited to 
any one group or any culture again. 
 
6.2.1 The game plan for transformation in South African rugby 
	
I believe that the only way for transformation in rugby to succeed is if it presented at a high 
level – and more importantly, if it is sustainable. The current structure in South African 
development rugby is flawed. I have found that it has not successfully changed the 
demographic of the professional rugby player in South Africa. The lack of funding poses a 
significant risk to the sustainability of programmes and prevents the establishment of much-
needed elite rugby development programmes.  
As set out in the business plan, the responsibility for development should rest with the 
commercial arm of the professional rugby franchise. The current scenario where development 
rests with the amateur body will need to be changed. The risk of relying on government funding 
and CSI funding to sustain these important programmes not only places the current 
programmes at risk but also prevents the much-needed expansion into elite development 
programmes. It is therefore imperative that the development of rugby funding be underwritten 
by the commercial entity. As stated in the business model the amateur body will still apply for 
funding and CSI spend through their NPO status, but the integrity of the programme will not 
be affected should the allocated funding be reduced or cancelled.  
I recommend that the budgeted amount for the entire programme is moved to The Sharks (Pty) 
Ltd. This will ensure the continued success of the development programme, as well as creating 
a sound platform to expand and improve the current program. The budget for the funding the 
development programme on The Sharks’ side will be derived from allocating commercial 
rights to sponsors and partners of the development program. 




• Hospitality suite 
• Match day tickets 
• Stadium parking 
• Match day promotions 
• Advertising in Sharks Magazine and match day program 
• Big screen advertising 
• LED advertising scroll advertising during matches 
• Player appearances 
• Invitations to Sharks events 
• Exposure on Sharks Super Rugby and Currie Cup match day jerseys. 
The total value of the allocated rights available is in excess of R12m. 
The current cost of the Sharks’ mass participation development programme amounts to roughly 
R5m per annum. The remaining additional funding after the current programme has been paid 
for will be used to build an elite development programme. 
As shown earlier in the research, athletes who participated in an elite sporting programme 
performed better on the international stage. 
As discussed earlier, schools that were historically regarded as traditional white schools 
produce a stable pipeline of top young players that gets absorbed into our professional rugby 
academies and universities. The challenge that the researcher identified is to bridge the gap 
between mass participation programmes and the professional sporting academies found at 
provincial and university level.  
 
6.2.2 Proposed structure 
	
I therefore propose the following structure: 
To bridge the gap between mass participation and professional academies, the development 
programme will be adapted to a three-tier programme, depicted in Figure 11. 






Figure 11: Three-tier development program 
 
• The first tier will be the traditional mass participation programmes that are currently 
run by the Sharks throughout the province. The programmes are structured according 
to the government requirements and should be approved for government funding. 
However as stated previously, the responsibility of the programmes and the funding 
will be underwritten by the Sharks. This will allow the community to participate in 
sustainable, professional programmes. 
 
• The second tier will be rolled out in the form of an asset-based community program. 
The goal in this level will be to have five schools in the province that have been 
developed in the five KZNRU sub unions, which are: 
 
1. Durban Sub Union (DRSU) 
2. Northern KZN Sub Union (NKZNRSU) 
3. Southern KZN Sub Union (SKZNRSU) 
4. Zululand Sub Union (ZRSU) 
5. Midlands Sub Union (MRSU)   
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Bottom up development program: Figure 1
FIGURE 1
Tier 1
Current program serving children from 550 schools in 52 hotspots reaching amount of 16 500 learners 
per annum. This tier is extremely important as it ties in with governments goal of mass participation.
Tier 2
The goal with this tier is to allow the best and most talented players that our development officers 
identify in tier one to be accommodated in identified schools within each KZN sub union. We are in 
the process of identifying the schools in each sub union and if necessary acquiring the funding options 
to provide for the boarding facility needed at each school. The big advantage of this stage is that we 
can invest time and resources in the individual’s education, coaching and ensure that he receives the 
correct nutritional support to allow for his ultimate development as a potential professional rugby 
player.
Tier 3
This tier will serve to develop the identified individual and accommodate them into a elite player 
development program. This will be done through two possible avenues to be confirmed after doing a 
in-depth feasibility analysis.
 • Purpose built elite center: This will be a facility that accommodates the elite 
  rugby players identified in Tier 1 and Tier 2 and will provide life skills, 
  education, nutrition and high level skills coaching
 • The goal for the elite center is to ensure that once an individual goes through 
  the development process of the Sharks Development program he will be 
  equipped for a career in rugby as well as successful life after sport
Funding
Historically the bulk of funding for these programs have 
been received from government grants. This is highly volatile 
as government budgets are often under pressure and it has 
shown to be a unreliable revenue stream.
In order to promote the image of rugby in South Africa 
and to appease political pressure as well as provide a 
stable pipeline of players to The Sharks I believe that the 
only viable solution is to use commercial rights to fund 
transformation.
As an incentive to big organizations 1% of turn over may be 
allocated to CSI projects that will in turn be used for social 
upliftment projects, which will allow for the organization to 





The schools in each of the sub-unions will be based in the community. Using capital investment 
from or sponsorships secured by The Sharks (Pty) Ltd, the school will be equipped with a 
boarding establishment. This purpose-built establishment will host the best talent identified 
during the mass participation programmes, called Talent ID programmes.  
The boys will be housed at the school closest to their home and will be provided with quality 
coaching, education and nutrition. The boys will be monitored by a professional team of 
doctors, educators and life coaches who will provide feedback to the parents or guardians of 
the young rugby players. While the emphasis will be on rugby, education and life skills will be 
equally important. The players who prove themselves during this stage will be accommodated 
in an elite development center. The remaining young rugby players will still be cared for and 
accompanied until they successfully complete their schooling and become successful members 
in their community. 
• The third tier will be an elite development center. The elite development level is for 
athletes who have been earmarked to become professional rugby players. This center 
will be in Durban. The athletes will be placed at a traditional rugby school with a 
boarding establishment. They will be offered a quality education and close supervision. 
This will allow the young players to be exposed to the pressure of playing rugby at a 
competitive level. The goal of the elite development level will be to help the young 
player adapt to life away from his community, and equip him with the vital skills he 
will need to deal with the pressures of professional rugby. 
 
In conclusion, through the research we have learned that development programmes will need 
to be approached in stages or tiers as illustrated, to successfully transform rugby. The mass 
participation programmes will allow previously disadvantaged communities to be exposed to 
rugby. As a minimum requirement for success, the programmes will need an elite approach, 
with infrastructure and top coaches, to ensure that the development of these young players 
continues.  
Local government has expressed the importance of creating facilities in disadvantaged areas to 
promote sports. However, this will not be designed to promote rugby specifically and it is 




Africa. The responsibility will lie with rugby to promote rugby, and not in the way it has 
historically been done.  
The radical change will need to take place at the point where responsibility for development is 
moved to the commercial entity, which is currently responsible for the professional teams at 
The Sharks. Once that change is complete and the funding is secured through commercial 
rights, as described above, the next stage will be to create an elite programme supported by 
infrastructure and expertise. The asset-based development programme will ensure that the 
young talented athletes will receive all the necessary tools to be successful.  
What does success of the elite programme look like? 
I believe that the elite development programme will be successful when it both produces top 
black rugby players, and also imparts skills that build educated, successful individuals who 
will ultimately impact their community in a positive way. Only then will development rugby 
programmes be effective and allow for rugby to be considered an inclusive sport that can 
impact a nation.  
 
6.3 Player retention 
	
There is an urgent need to address the issue of player retention and to curb the exodus of players 
leaving South Africa to play abroad. At the end of 2015, SA Rugby Annual counted 280 top 
level players playing abroad. During 2016, at least 45 additional players left South Africa to 
play overseas (Nel, 2016b). These numbers support the upward trend of players leaving since 
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Table 21: Players based overseas 
 
It is concerning to note that the number of Springboks leaving South Africa has increased at a 
steady rate compared with non-Springbok players. Their departure will have a marked impact 
on the quality of South African teams playing in both Super Rugby as well as in the Currie Cup 
competitions. The absence of the top players will remove what I have identified as the celebrity 
impact of these players.  
My research has shown that the absence or presence of top players, and their celebrity status, 
has an impact on revenue generated from the competition. The revenue model included in the 
business plan revealed a direct correlation between success on the field and increased revenue. 
The presence of the top players will add to the success on the field. Equally important is the 
celebrity status of the top players and the weight it adds to what I defined as brand value in the 
revenue model.  
The effect of top players being available to play in South Africa can be linked to what 
Downward and Dawson referred to as competitive balance in sport. Competitive balance in 
sport uses attendance tracking as an indicator of competitive balance, and is based on the 
assumption that spectator interest will be higher when the competition is reasonably even 
(Owen et al., 2002). This is usually regarded to be as applicable to rugby union as to other team 
sports. Extensive literature is available on modelling the effect of competitive balance on 
attendance, and to a lesser extent, the effect it might have on television audiences (Downward 
& Dawson, 2000). In the South African context, the loss of the best players to overseas clubs 




I am confident that further research, and particularly research into monetizing social media, 
will provide a further link between high profile players, the brand and social media – and the 
potential revenue streams that can be generated through the relationship between the three areas 
mentioned.  
Ultimately, the question will be what the relationship is between developing an inclusive 
business model for rugby, and the effect that player exodus will have on the success of 
developing this business model. The answer is simple. For a business to maximize its revenue 
streams, it will have to ensure that it can provide the best possible product to the market. In the 
case of rugby, the most important element of the on-field success of rugby is the quality of top 
players. As the research shows, there is a direct correlation between on-field success and 
increased revenue.  
As discussed, the constant outflow of players from South Africa, and especially the exodus of 
top players, will have, and already has had a negative impact on the organization’s revenue. In 
the proposed solution to the problem of creating an inclusive business model for rugby – which 
has been explained in the attached business model – I found that the commercial entity should 
underwrite the funding of the transformation programmes. This will ensure the sustainability 
and the success of transformation and development programmes in rugby. The departure of 
celebrity players causes declining revenue. This revenue erosion will eventually place 
increased pressure on the development and transformation programmes that are funded through 
the sale of commercial rights of the professional body.  
The debate around how to keep top players in South Africa is currently ongoing.  
The model currently applied in New Zealand rugby is simple but it seems extremely effective. 
The New Zealand national rugby team is known worldwide as the All Blacks. New Zealand 
rugby has achieved constant success at both provincial and international level. The New 
Zealand Super Rugby franchises have won the Super Rugby competition 15 times since 1996 
- more than both South Africa and Australia (SANZAR, 2016). The All Blacks is the only team 
to have won the Rugby World Cup three times. It has been the number one-rated team on the 
World Rugby rankings since 2008 (worldrugby.org, 2016).  
The success of New Zealand rugby is not linked to the number of players available in the 




as many pre-teens playing rugby, when compared with New Zealand (Lambert & Durandt, 
2010). 
Age Group South Africa New Zealand Australia 
Pre-teens 239 614 63 924 25 609 
Teens 148 779 40 257 20 002 
Senior 84 522 27 203 37 179 
Total 472 915 131 384 82 790 
 
Table 22: Number of rugby players in southern hemisphere 
 
This shows that the quality of the player available in the country is much more important than 
the number of players available. SARU only contracts a small number of Springboks to keep 
the best players in South Africa. It was reported that 20 players received national contracts 
from SARU in 2016 (Burnard, 2015). 
In contrast to the South African model, the New Zealand Rugby Union contracts all 
professional players through centralized national contracts. This effectively means that the 
New Zealand Rugby Union (NZRFU) has monopsony power in terms of the market to contract 
players in New Zealand rugby (Owen et al., 2002). The NZRFU does not only contract an elite 
pool of All Blacks – as is the case in South Africa. It also contracts all the Super Rugby players 
as well as the local provincial players (allblacks.com, 2010). Currently the country’s top 220 
players are contracted.  
These measures ensure that New Zealand maintains a core group of high level players, playing 
in the country. This ensures continuity and increases the quality of the product, which in turn 
relates to on-field success. The NZRFU has also increased its contracting to include other 
emerging players and to retain in New Zealand. In an article on rugby website rugby365.com, 
it was reported how South African junior players are targeted by overseas clubs from as young 
as 18 years, and that we have already seen the some of the best young players leave South 




New Zealand and England both implement another extremely successful measure. If a player 
has ambitions to play for the national team, the player will be required to be affiliated to a 
provincial or club team in the country. It is of interest to note that at the time of this research, 
New Zealand was the top ranked team in the world and England was the second best team in 
the world (worldrugby.org, 2016). 
Through research and facts presented in this chapter, I have shown that having top players 
playing in South Africa will not only raise the profile of the sport in the country, but will also 
positively impact revenue. This will be achieved through successful on-field results that will 
drive revenue upwards, as well the enhanced marketability of celebrity players playing in South 
Africa. Increased revenue will be essential to the health of the organization and will result in a 
better financial future. The ultimate goal of this research is to provide an inclusive business 
model for rugby in South Africa. If the organization’s financial health is secure, the provincial 
rugby franchises will be able to allocate enough funds to ensure sustainable and successful 
transformation and development programmes. 
 
6.4. Financial Health of rugby as a business 
	
The goal of this research is to look at developing South African rugby franchises into inclusive 
and successful business models, using The Sharks (Pty) Ltd as the principle case study. This 
will be required to ensure that rugby in South Africa grows and becomes a sport that includes 
the entire population of South Africa, and that is accepted by all races, genders and cultures of 
the rainbow nation. 
I reviewed the financial health of professional rugby teams across the world to form a 
hypothesis on the financial health of professional rugby in South Africa. The information I 
gathered through my research will help me to form an educated opinion on the overall health 
of world rugby. I will then take my findings and apply them to the South African context – and 
more importantly the case study for this research, The Sharks (Pty) Ltd. 
The world of professional rugby is divided into the northern and southern hemispheres. The 
southern hemisphere season starts in January and ends in December. The northern hemisphere 




provincial competition for the southern hemisphere is called Super Rugby and consists of 18 
teams from five participating countries. The five countries are New Zealand, Australia, South 
Africa, Japan and Argentina.  
The most important club competition in the northern hemisphere is the Champions Cup and 
the second tier competition in Europe is the Challenge Cup. The Champions Cup consists of 
the top 20 club teams in the northern hemisphere, made up from six nations. The six nations 
playing in the Champions Cup are England, Ireland, Wales, Scotland, France and Italy (EPCR, 
2016b).  
The European Rugby Champions Cup is an annual rugby union tournament organized by 
European Professional Club Rugby (EPCR). It is the top-tier competition for clubs whose 
countries' national teams compete in the Six Nations Competition. Clubs qualify for the 
Champions Cup via their final positions in their respective national/regional leagues, which are 
the French Top 14, Celtic Pro 12 and the English Premiership. Those who do not qualify are 
instead eligible to compete in the second-tier Challenge Cup. 
The Challenge Cup is the second tier elite European competition. Clubs are made up from eight 
nations: England, Ireland, Wales, Scotland, France, Italy, Russia, Romania, Spain, Belgium, 
Germany and Portugal. (EPCR, 2016a). Twenty teams qualify for the Challenge Cup, 18 from 
the three main European domestic leagues – the French Top 14, and Celtic Pro 12 and the 
English Premiership – and two from a special qualifying competition between teams from other 
European nations. 
The research in this paper has identified the problem of South African rugby players leaving 
South Africa to play professionally abroad. While Japan is an attractive choice for players when 
choosing to play abroad, the majority of players choose to play in Europe, and more specifically 
the six nations participating in the Champions Cup and Challenge Cup. I will study the financial 
health of the top tier rugby competitions, to form a hypothesis around the financial health of 





6.4.1. Southern Hemisphere  
 
• New Zealand 
New Zealand is currently the leading rugby nation in the world. The national team, the All 
Blacks, is the only team to have won the Rugby World Cup on three occasions. They are the 
current Rugby World Cup champions. New Zealand rugby also dominates Super Rugby, and 
currently holds the most titles of all the participating countries. The New Zealand Super Rugby 
franchises have won the Super Rugby competition 15 times since 1996 – more than any of the 
other competing countries (SANZAR, 2016).  
In August 2016, the NZRFU released a report on the financial results of rugby as a business in 
New Zealand. The report was titled Deloitte Sports Review: State of the Unions Report 
(Huntington, 2016). The annual report is published in New Zealand and provides a financial 
review of the country’s leading rugby unions. The report raised concerns around the financial 
health of provincial rugby in New Zealand. More specifically, the report noted that for rugby 
to be successful as a business in New Zealand, it needed to find a way to reverse the trend of 
reducing revenue. From a financial perspective, the combined unions in New Zealand posted 
an overall deficit of $1.4m, reduced by $ 2.6m from the previous financial year. This is the first 
deficit recorded by the consolidated unions since 2011 (Huntington, 2016). The revenue for 
the combined unions also dropped 5.4% from the previous year, and the revenue for the 2015 
financial year was the lowest recorded since 2007. 
“As many other not-for-profit organizations will attest, there comes a point where there are no 
more notches on the belt to tighten and other avenues must be sought to resolve the situation 
facing them.” Grant Jarrold, Deloitte partner (Deloitte, 2016). The report shows the decline in 
revenue, but it also suggests that the situation is not as dire as it may seem. Jarrold says that 
“unions are in better shape now than they were several years ago. However, continued pressure 
on traditional sources of revenue means they are more reliant on New Zealand Rugby grants 
than before. To help themselves, the unions could explore more innovative ways to increase 
and diversify revenue, as well as find new ways to grow support for their representative teams” 
(Deloitte, 2016). 




need for new revenue streams to replace the declining traditional revenue streams will be 
essential to ensure financial stability of the sport in the future. 
• Australia 
Australian Rugby Union (ARU), Chief Operations Officer Rob Clarke said, “Australian rugby 
can’t shrink its way to success.” (Smith, 2016). 
The ARU has five franchises competing in Super Rugby: New South Wales Waratahs, 
Queensland Reds, ACT Brumbies, Melbourne Rebels and Perth-based Western Force. When 
releasing the financial position of rugby union franchise Queensland Reds in Australia, Jim 
Carmichael, CEO of The Reds, reported a loss in excess of $1m for the financial year 2015. 
The Reds are the second most powerful province in Australia, producing about 40 per cent of 
Australia’s Super Rugby talent (Smith, 2016).  
From a financial perspective, the main concern within the Australian game is the financial 
future of the Western Force franchise based in Perth, Western Australia. Rugby WA, which 
runs The Western Force, reported a loss of over $600,000 in 2014, and is set to report an even 
bigger deficit in 2015 (Payten & Pandaram, 2016). As a proposed solution to the Western 
Force’s financial problems the ARU is set to take over the running of the franchise, in a bid to 
resolve the Perth club’s long-running financial problems.  
The proposed restructure has come off the back of findings reported by financial analysis 
consultants Accenture. Their report found that the current business model, as well as the 
depressed local economy in Western Australia, will lead to ongoing financial trouble. The 
consultancy suggested that the ARU take over the management of the Western Force (Payten 
& Pandaram, 2016). The ARU reportedly paid the Western Force $800,000 for its intellectual 
property rights, on the condition that the ARU has insight on all financial matters pertaining to 
the franchise. 
Compared with the available players in New Zealand and South Africa, Australia has the 
smallest pool of players to choose from (Lambert & Durandt, 2010). Australian rugby players 
therefore demand higher wages due to the smaller numbers of quality players available to the 
Australian Super Rugby franchises. It is reported that there are around 175 contracted 
professional players in Australia, and they cost collectively the same as the 450 contracted 




traditional revenue streams, is also impacting negatively on Australian rugby’s financial health. 
• South Africa 
 
The business plan contained in this paper discussed in detail the financial health of Super 
Rugby franchises in South Africa. However, as an overview I have included the extract from 
the business plan to provide the context of South African provincial rugby when compared 
with professional rugby teams in other top level rugby-playing nations. South Africa has six 
teams playing in the Super Rugby competition: The Sharks, The Bulls, The Lions, The 
Stormers and the EP Kings. 
1. In 2016, The Sharks have been in the press due to financial problems and 
irregularities pointed out by a previous CEO, Brian van Zyl. Van Zyl claimed 
that the union was in a dire financial position, and insisted that the financial 
statements of the commercial company be made available to the public (Van 
Zyl, 2016).  
2. In September 2016, The Bulls made a public appeal to fans to come out to the 
stadium to support their team. In an article on Sport24 journalist Brendan Nel 
claimed that attendance had dropped in the past few years. In just one example, 
tickets for a semifinal home match, which were previously certain to be sold 
out, had not been sold out by the Wednesday before the match. Barend van 
Graan, the CEO of The Bulls, stated his concern in the article that only  
11 612 tickets of a 50 000 plus capacity stadium had been sold (Nel, 2016c). 
This is a clear indication that revenue had declined at The Bulls. 
3. The Lions has been the most successful South African team in the last three 
years, playing in the Super Rugby final in 2016. However, an article published 
on News24 in 2012 claimed that the Lions were insolvent. The article claimed 
that total liabilities exceeded assets by R73m in 2010 (Mseleku, 2012).  
4. The Cheetahs, who were the Currie Cup champions in 2016, received a R5m 
sponsorship from the Free State government. Teboho Letshaba reported on 
SABC news that Cheetahs received R5m from the Free State government, and 
that the funds would go a long way towards easing the union’s financial woes 
(Letshaba, 2016). 




obtained an order for the provisional liquidation of WP Rugby (Pty), which is 
the commercial trading entity of WP Rugby. The president of the WP Rugby 
Union claimed a smaller sponsorship pool, as well as declining gate and season 
ticket sales as some of the contributing factors impeding the financial 
sustainability of the union (Harrison, 2016). 
6. The EP Kings were placed under provisional liquidation in March 2016. The 
economic impact on the union and the players was devastating. SARU had to 
intervene, and 36 professional players led the liquidation order in a bid to 
recover money owed to them by the cash-strapped union (News24, 2016). 
This outline proves that there is a significant financial threat within South African rugby. The 
fact that all the Super Rugby franchises have suffered financial problems in recent times 
demonstrates that an urgent change is needed in the way rugby operates as a business.  
If the financial strains remain, SARU’s financial health will also come under threat. As pointed 
out earlier, the constant financial pressure and underperformance in South African rugby can 
be attributed to amateur officials operating within an ostensibly professional environment, 
which often prevents sound commercial decisions from being made (Del Carme, 2015). The 
SARU constitution only allows for a maximum of 49.9% outside equity in the 14 provincial 
teams. This also adds another financial constraint that should be reviewed to ensure the 
financial health of South African professional rugby. 
 




The English national rugby team won the Rugby World Cup in 2003. The team has historically 
been a major force in world rugby. The English Premiership is the club competition that 
provides players to the national team. The competition comprises 12 clubs. At the end of each 
season (RFU, 2016), the bottom club is relegated to a league called the RFU Champions League 
(RFU, 2016). The winner of the Champions League is promoted to play in the Premiership the 
following season. Historically, the English Premiership has attracted top international players 




African players who have moved to the English Premiership in 2016 are, among others, Willie 
Le Roux, who moved from The Sharks to London Wasps; JP Peterson, who moved from The 
Sharks to Leicester Tigers; and Schalk Burger, who moved from the Stormers to Saracens. 
The English professional club rugby system has learned much from the commercial business 
principles applied by other successful sporting organizations such as the NFL and NHL in the 
USA; and the NRL and AFL in Australia (premiershiprugby.com, 2016). As a collective, 
Premiership Rugby and its clubs led the way in England when they introduced a salary cap in 
1999. They did this to ensure the financial viability of all clubs and the Aviva Premiership 
Rugby competition; to control inflationary pressures on clubs’ costs; and to provide a level 
playing field for clubs to ensure a competitive Aviva Premiership Rugby competition 
(premiershiprugby.com, 2016). 
The success of the salary cap in English rugby has been brought into question. The financial 
health of top English rugby club Saracens was exposed when it was announced that the club 
had accumulated debts totaling $64.3m.  
When questioned about the financial results, Saracens chairman Nigel Wray said that “The 
curiosity is that the loss could be quite easily substantially reduced simply by having less 
players in the squad and finishing 11th! But that would send out a terrible message to the 
players that we weren't ambitious; would hardly attract sponsors and would harm the 
brand.”  (sportbusinessdaily.com, 2016). In accounts filed at Companies House, it was stated 
that the losses would be funded by Saracens’ parent company, Premier Team Holdings Ltd. 
The accounts also stated that the support is not legally binding, which in effect poses a potential 
risk to the financial future of Saracens. 
Whatever the situation around Saracens and their title as the “most indebted club in rugby 
history” (Harris, 2016), it does seem that the English Premiership structure has, to a large 
degree, been successful. It could be said that the objectives of the salary cap are achieved when 
looking at the financial success the league is currently experiencing. More clubs have been 
breaking even than before the salary cap was implemented (premiershiprugby.com, 2016).  
English rugby implemented another important measure after the Rugby World Cup in 2011. 
The Rugby Football Union, which governs English rugby, announced that it will no longer 
select foreign-based players to play for the English national team. Two reasons were given for 




best English players play in it. The second reason is to give the RFU more control and better 
access to current or potential players for England (Jones, 2015). 
Having looked at the English model and how it has been adapted to professional rugby, I 
conclude that the salary cap and the decision to choose only local players for the national team 
had a successful impact. However, it is a concern that Saracens, which is currently the most 
successful team in England, is known for having the highest debt of any rugby team in world 
rugby (BBC, 2016).  
 
• French Rugby 
 
France has more professional teams than any other rugby-playing country (LNR, 2016). The 
Top 14 and ProD2 competitions are both fully professional. These competitions attract the top 
international players from around the world to play in France. The profile of the Top 14 has 
been enhanced in recent times, with the biggest names in world rugby playing club rugby in 
France. Examples include Dan Carter, Duanne Vermeulen, Bakkies Botha, Jonny Wilkinson 
and George Gregan – to name a few. The Top 14 features the most international players 
represented at the last Rugby World Cup 2015 (LNR, 2016). With so many top players, the 
Top 14 has the largest contract for broadcasting rights of any club competition in world rugby.  
Revenue in French rugby has shown a steady increase over the last 10 years, increasing on 
average at more than 12% per annum during that time. In the 2014/2015 financial year, income 
increased by 12% in the Top 14 and by 6% in the ProD2. The broadcasting rights increased 
from 43m Euros in 2013/2014 to 83m Euros in 2014/2015. According to the Direction 
Nationale D'aide et de Contrôle de Destion (DNACG) report published by the Ligue Nationale 
de Rugby (LNR) (DNACG, 2016), the combined position of all 30 professional clubs reflects 
a loss for the financial year 2014/2015 of just under 20m Euros. The DNACG is the financial 
regulatory body for professional rugby in France. Its aim is to ensure financial health within 
professional rugby in the country. 
The DNACG requires that all professional rugby clubs provide their financial statements as 
well as their budgets by a certain date. The DNACG then studies the submissions to formulate 




In the 2014/2015 season, the DNACG found the following irregularities; 
• A club was relegated one division for administrative reasons. This was linked to the 
financial information presented to the DNACG, and the club was found to be non-
compliant with DNACG regulations. 
• The player budget for five clubs was limited due to unsatisfactory financial guarantees. 
In total, 49 contracts were refused approval until the DNACG were satisfied. Only then 
were the contracts approved before the start of the competition. 
• The Board of Directors of the DNACG called five clubs to a special meeting at the end 
of the 2014/2015 season. During this meeting, the DNACG requested the five clubs to 
provide guarantees and a plan for how to address the losses they made during the current 
season. 
• The DNACG refused to promote an amateur club due to unsatisfactory financial 
guarantees offered by the club, even though the club won in its division (DNACG, 
2016). 
 
These examples show that the role of the DNACG is extremely important in ensuring the 
financial well-being of professional rugby in France. Unfortunately, financial trouble is a 
regular feature in French club rugby. John Daniell writes, in his book “Confessions of a Rugby 
Mercenary”, that French clubs often find themselves running out of money during the season. 
This often leaves the professional club in ruins: the best players leave the club, which then has 
to rebuild its team in the following season (Daniell, 2009).  
In extreme circumstances, the clubs that do not rectify their financial position within the 
DNACG’s timeframe are relegated to the amateur divisions within French rugby. This often 
has a devastating impact on the clubs. If they do recover, it takes a long time for the club to 
reach the top level again.  
In conclusion, after comparing the financial health of the top rugby playing nations in the 
northern and southern hemispheres, the research shows that rugby as a business is under 
pressure throughout the world.  
During the research on the finances in rugby, one common factor emerged: traditional revenue 
streams throughout world rugby are under pressure. Revenue from traditional streams such as 




matches. By contrast, revenue from broadcasting rights has increased throughout all the 
countries, which indicates that the popularity of the sport is growing. The decline in attendance 
is linked more to changing consumer behavior of rugby supporters. This highlights the need 






CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Reflections on research and areas where further research is required  
	
The three research areas identified within this study are: 
• Transformation in rugby 
• Rugby as a business 
• Players leaving South Africa to play overseas 
 
I have reflected on each area and felt that each required more research in the following fields. 
 
7.1.1 Transformation in rugby 
	
It is important to research the effectiveness of the current mass participation programmes. This 
paper looks briefly at the success of the programmes. But I believe there is scope for further 
research into the subject. Research into asset-based community development programmes 
within rugby can also provide more information regarding the correct approach to achieve 
maximum success in these programmes. 
 
7.1.2 Rugby as a business 
	
A comparative case study between rugby as a business and other professional sporting codes 
will help to provide the information required to compare business models of the different 
sporting franchises. The comparative case study will also reveal recommendations to rugby’s 
governing bodies. I recommend reviewing the different constitutions that govern sporting 
codes throughout the world. This exercise would compare the financial position of independent 




organizations that require a majority amateur shareholding – as is the case for rugby in South 
Africa.	
	
7.1.3 Players leaving South Africa to play overseas 
	
I believe that the recommended research should form part of a deeper study into the 
management of celebrity sportsmen. This should include a deeper analysis of the impact on 
South African rugby of the exodus of high profile players compared with the impact that South 
African rugby players have had on the overseas leagues. This could be monetized. Using this 
information, South African rugby could make a calculated decision on the potential investment 
needed to prevent the exodus of these players to overseas markets. 
 
7.2. Policy recommendation for rugby in South Africa 
	
The research into creating an inclusive business model for rugby in South Africa was an 
especially personal experience. I looked at the research problem through the eyes of a rugby 
fan, a retired professional rugby player, a current rugby administrator and a passionate South 
African. 
I believe that the only way to achieve a sustainable and inclusive game of rugby in South Africa 
is to take big and brave policy decisions. I suggest three policy recommendations that will 
support the pursuit of this goal. 
 
7.2.1 Responsibility for transformation to be moved to the commercial company 
	
Responsibility for transforming and developing of rugby in South Africa should lie with the 
commercial body of professional rugby. The current structure forces the amateur body of 
provincial rugby to ensure the roll out of transformation programmes in South Africa. While 
some unions help their amateur company to run the programmes, the NPO will continue to be 




Africa. NPOs qualify for grants and SCI funding if they meet the correct criteria. The for-profit 
organization will not qualify for the same funding.  
 
Under the new policy, my recommendation is that all provinces affiliated to SARU will be 
required to underwrite their development and transformation programmes through the 
commercial company. In the case of The Sharks, the change will be made from the KZNRU to 
The Sharks (Pty) Ltd.  
 
This recommendation does not suggest that rugby should discard the funding options available 
through CSI or government funding that can be paid into a section 18A, NPO company (SARS, 
2016). Rather, I am proposing that a hybrid model between the for-profit company and the 
NPO company be implemented. This policy aims to protect development programmes in the 
event of government budget cuts, or if CSI the funding available to rugby is reduced. It will 
ensure the integrity and continuity of development and transformation programmes and will 
remove the funding uncertainties associated with funding through government grants and CSI 
spend. 
 
The success of this policy will also provide for sustainable growth in previously disadvantaged 
areas (PDA), where rugby was historically not promoted, and will build the sport’s supporter 
base. 
 
7.2.2 Change of shareholding of professional teams in South Africa 
 
SARU’s current constitution provides for a maximum shareholding of 49% to any outside 
company or individual who might be interested in the ownership of a professional rugby team 
in South Africa. This research, and my personal experience, has shown that this is problematic 
for professional rugby in South Africa. The existing 49% cap on shareholding not only limits 
the funding of professional rugby in South Africa, but it also lends itself to bureaucracy that 
prevents commercial decision-making, since the majority shareholding lies with the non-
commercial amateur body of rugby.  
 
By contrast, if implemented correctly, a revised policy will rejuvenate rugby in South Africa 




between SARU and the newly structured unions should require compulsory affiliation to 
SARU and the adoption of the transformation policy as set out in point 9.1 above. SARU will 
benefit from this arrangement, too. Since the 14 provincial unions make up the SARU 
shareholding, SARU will effectively be owned by commercial shareholders. 
 
7.2.3 Selecting only players based in South Africa for the national team 
	
The current ruling that allows for South African players playing for overseas clubs to be 
selected for the Springboks has, in my opinion, accelerated the exodus of top South African 
players to overseas countries. The recent successes of New Zealand and England have 
demonstrated that such a ruling has a positive effect on the national team’s results.  
 
If players know that they will only be chosen to play for their country if they are playing their 
provincial rugby in South Africa, it is likely that they will play in South Africa for longer. It 
will also reward the players who choose to stay and play in South Africa. While it is likely that 
we will lose players to overseas clubs, I believe that fewer players will leave. In addition, 
younger talented players with international ambitions are more likely to elect to stay in South 
Africa to increase their chances of playing for the national team.  
 
Given the large numbers of players currently playing, the quality of the current group playing 
overseas, and the fact that the South African players playing overseas are tied into contracts of 
between one and three years, I recommend a phased approach to implementing this policy. The 
policy could be implemented over three years, starting in 2017: 
 
• 2017 Season: A total of five players based overseas are eligible for selection to the 
Springboks during the season. 
• 2018 Season: A total of three players based overseas eligible for selection to the 
Springboks during the season. 
• 2019 Season: All players playing for the Springboks should be based and playing rugby 
in South Africa. 
  
I believe this policy will not only allow the national team to be stronger and more successful, 




playing in South Africa, which will raise the profile of the local game, which will in turn lead 
to increased revenue opportunities. 
 
7.3 Final Thoughts 
 
Insanity: doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. 
Albert Einstein 
 
7.3.1 Need for change 
	
I experienced a wide range of emotions during the journey through this study. I firmly believe 
that the conclusion reached and the recommendations presented will create a positive legacy 
and will result in sustainable change that will led to an inclusive and successful business model 
for rugby in South Africa. 
To achieve an exciting future for rugby in South Africa, I believe that the right strategy should 
accompany the findings made during this research. Strategy and change go hand-in-hand. If 
the correct implementation strategy accompanies my research findings, it will be possible to 
achieve the desired objective of creating a sustainable and inclusive business model for rugby 
in South Africa. 
During 2016, rugby lost ground on all levels. Off the field, the Minister of Sport, Fikile 
Mbalula, publicly reprimanded the sport for transforming too slowly. This culminated with the 
ministerial ban on teams in South Africa bidding for major sporting events (Ngoepe, 2016).  
The professional game has been plagued with continuous financial problems. The EP Kings 
failed to pay its players (News24, 2016), and towards the end of 2016, Western Province, based 
in the birthplace of South African rugby, announced that it is applying for voluntary liquidation 
(Harrison, 2016). On the field, the Springboks lost to Italy for the first time in the country’s 
history (Ray, 2016) and the national team finished the year in fifth position on the World Rugby 
rankings (worldrugby.org, 2016). This is unheard of for a team that was world rugby champion 
in 1995 and 2007.  
This research aimed to create a sustainable and inclusive business model for rugby. It began 




situation. The history of rugby in South Africa provided valuable and extremely important 
insights. Traditionally, rugby has been perceived as a white man’s sport and that development 
and transformation is needed to introduce rugby to the black and coloured communities in 
South Africa.  
However, the reality is that rugby has a rich history in both the black and coloured communities 
in South Africa, with formal structures in these communities dating back to the formation of 
the South African Coloured Rugby Football Board (SACRFB) in 1897 (Cupido, 2014), and the 
formation of the South African Bantu Rugby Board (SABRB) in 1935 (Odendaal, 1995). The 
formation of these rugby boards proves that rugby was not only favoured by the white 
population in South Africa. Rather, the game has long had a following among all races and 
cultures within the country. The reason for the separation was due to apartheid and the racial 
segregation that accompanied the apartheid regime. 
During the apartheid era, rugby as a sport grew among the white population. At the same time, 
apartheid laws prevented black and coloured communities from participating. This has left a 
negative stigma that the sport still faces today.  
In my research, I have found that development and transformation policies for rugby should 
not be aimed at introducing rugby to PDAs. Rather, the aim should be to provide a platform 
for talented plyers living in the PDAs to have access to the facilities, coaching and 
infrastructure required to live out their passion.  
The success of the current programmes and the funding requirements for this important part of 
rugby’s future in South Africa need to be addressed. The research has shown that while 
development programmes are currently in place to promote rugby in PDAs, these programmes 
are mostly aimed at mass participation. I do not believe that the mass participation programmes 
are sufficient to leave a long-term legacy for the young players participating. It is also debatable 
whether the mass participation programmes are successful in producing professional players. I 
have found that more elite training and development is required to produce professional rugby 
players from PDAs.  
This paper proposes a three-tiered development model.  




The second tier forms an asset-based community development programme, which will not only 
require coaching but will also provide infrastructure. I recommend targeting existing schools 
in the PDAs, which will be developed through capital investment into the schools. The schools 
will serve to develop the players with skills that exceed those needed on the playing field.  
The third and final tier will be an elite development center. This tier will accommodate the 
rugby players who have moved through the mass participation programme, graduated into the 
asset based community development programme, and who have been identified as potential 
professional rugby players. The elite level will provide top coaching, nutrition and strength and 
conditioning development for the young players. It will also focus on education and life skills 
to help the athlete from a PDA to cope with the pressures associated with professional rugby. 
I believe that this structure will provide a positive legacy and will ensure a pipeline of black 
and coloured players who are able to compete in professional rugby at the highest level. The 
secondary benefits of this structure are the upliftment of community infrastructure and the 
upgrade of facilities required to accommodate the programme. An additional benefit is that the 
programme will still address the government-identified need for traditional mass participation. 
Mass participation will build the awareness of rugby in PDAs and the second and third tier of 
the programme will provide for active participants in rugby at all levels. The successful 
implementation of this development structure throughout South Africa will lead to rugby 
becoming a truly inclusive sport in the country. 
Traditionally, development funding came from government grants and company CSI spend. In 
this research, I have suggested that the only way to sustain development and transformation in 
rugby, and especially to build the sustainability of the proposed programme, is to shift the 
responsibility for funding the programme to the professional arm of the rugby franchise. This 
is a change from the historical approach, where the amateur company bears the development 
responsibility.  
The professional arm will use its commercial rights to raise funding for the development 
programmes. At the same time, the section 18A non-profit company under the amateur section 
will still apply for government grants and corporate CSI spend. However, the success and 
sustainability of the programmes will not rely entirely on these revenue sources. The 





The transfer of development spend to the commercial entity will place additional strain on an 
already struggling industry. Therefore, it was extremely important to look at the financial 
health of rugby as a business. The research showed that rugby as a business is currently under 
pressure and many professional teams are struggling financially.  
This research focused on reasons that rugby franchises are under financial pressure. Using The 
Sharks as my case study, I found that the traditional revenue streams available to rugby are 
declining.  
Smaller stadium audiences and better live broadcast offerings are reducing match day revenue. 
At the same time, non-traditional revenue streams increased, with significant growth in 
broadcasting rights payments.  
I also identified a need to develop new revenue streams to increase income in rugby. In the 
inclusive business model developed in this paper, I identified new revenue streams including 
stadium eventing and monetizing digital media by creating an online platform that will 
encourage users to become members or subscribers for an additional fee. 
The strategy to increase revenue by hosting more events at the stadium has the potential to 
succeed and I am confident that it will. The Sharks has all the ingredients required to host 
stadium events. The stadium currently consists of multiple venues that will be able to 
accommodate most events. In addition to the venues, most of the services required to host 
events are already available at the stadium. These can be maximized for increased profit. These 
services include catering, the liquor store and security and cleaning services. These will all 
supplement the venue hire.  
The only additional expense to The Sharks will be an events coordinator, who will need to be 
recruited. Once in post, he or she will be incentivized through remuneration linked to 
performance. If marketed and priced correctly, I believe that this venture will be successful and 
profitable for the organization. 
The research revealed that the strength of the brand is an important factor in successfully 
monetizing digital media. It is equally as important to understand the individual fan and the 
behavior patterns of the group of followers or subscribers on the specific platforms. More 
research is required to fully understand these specific areas. Due to the nature of social media 




to stay current and to provide the service and value that will motivate supporters to subscribe 
to a membership and pay a monthly fee towards the subscription.  
I have found that the success of any subscriber-driven model is in the value it offers to the 
client. In this instance, the client is a fan and the value will be in the form of content. The 
content that will drive the fan to subscribe will be specific content that will be exclusive to the 
member’s area of the application.  
Celebrity players and the strength of the sporting brand will be big drivers in convincing fans 
to subscribe. The content will be developed by The Sharks and will only be offered to paying 
members. The business plan, attached to this paper in Appendix 1, shows the potential annuity 
revenue for the organization. 
The quality of the individual players in the team plays a definite role in the on- and off-field 
success of The Sharks. This research has found that losing players to overseas countries, driven 
mostly by the strength of the yen, euro and pound, has had a clear negative impact on South 
African rugby. The impact of the player exodus has meant that our national team, the 
Springboks – which is, in my opinion, the strongest commercial brand in South Africa – has 
lost ground against the world’s other top rugby playing nations.  
The latest rankings show that the 1995 and 2007 Rugby World Cup champions slipped to 
number five in the world rugby rankings at the end of the 2016 season. Under the new coach, 
Allister Coetzee, the Springboks have won only four out of 12 matches during the 2016 season, 
and recorded its first-ever loss against Italy in November 2016 (Telegraph Sport, 2016).  
These results will have a negative effect on supporter sentiment in South Africa. This negative 
sentiment will effectively reduce revenue for the provincial franchises in South Africa.  
The exodus of top players negatively effects the on-field results of South African teams, as 
well as off-field revenue. As discussed in this paper, The Sharks have lost the following 






• Jannie Du Plessis 
• Bismark Du Plessis 
• Francois Steyn 
• Marcell Coetzee 
 
Together, these high-profile players have played a combined total of 230 test matches for the 
Springboks. The loss of these players to European clubs not only weakens the Springboks’ and 
The Sharks’ on the field, but also damages The Sharks’ brand. Without high profile players 
available to play, fans are less attracted to the team. This has a negative economic impact, 
caused by declining match day attendances. Smaller audiences reduce other related revenue 
streams linked to match day attendances. This places the organization under increasing 
pressure.  
After the disappointing rugby season, SARU has finally acknowledged the serious impact of 
the player exodus. The organization is reviewing the eligibility rules currently in place. The 
current rules allow the Springboks to select players who are based overseas. However, SARU 
is considering amending that ruling to only allow players based in South Africa to be 
considered eligible for Springbok selection.  
While I believe that this measure will not stop players from leaving South Africa, it will slow 
down the exodus and keep the top players in South Africa for a longer time during their career.  
I also believe that South Africa is carrying too many professional rugby players in too many 
professional teams. It will be possible to pay players more if the current 14 professional 
provinces are reduced to eight. Eight provinces will be able to share a greater portion of 
broadcasting rights than 14. The eight teams will also be more competitive and will allow for 
a better product, which will drive spectator interest and corresponding match day income. 
As discussed, there is a need to address declining revenue streams and player exodus to ensure 
the sustainability of rugby as a business.  
The research showed that professional clubs and provinces throughout world rugby are all 
under financial pressure. In my research I found that professional teams in Australia, New 




are in stark contrast to the growing popularity of rugby as a global sport. This shows that 
rugby’s business model in a global context needs to be reconsidered.  
Clubs and provinces in South African rugby are performing worse than their overseas 
counterparts. As discussed in the research, all the Super Rugby franchises in South Africa have 
experienced financial trouble within the last five years. This paper has provided the reasons 
why the franchises are under pressure and has presented solutions on how to make rugby 
profitable. 
The main points of the research are summarized as follows:  
1. The history of rugby in South Africa 
2. Importance of development and transformation in rugby 
3. Need to create new revenue streams in rugby 
4. Stop top players leaving South Africa 
5. Ensure the financial health of South African rugby as a business 
 
These points are important to understand because they are critical to achieving the goal of a 
sustainable inclusive business model for rugby in South Africa, which was key objective for 
this research. 
My research has shown that the only way to achieve the goal of transforming rugby in South 
Africa is to implement and assure the sustainability of the three-tier development programme 
created through this research. Uncertainty in funding for development programmes was 
identified as a risk to the sustainability and expansion of these programmes. This can be 
addressed by attributing commercial rights from the professional company to raise funds to 
ensure the sustainability of the development projects.  
However, to sustain the funding from the professional company, rugby as a business must be 
in good health. To ensure the financial health of the business, the revenue and product should 
be secure. To secure revenue, we will seek to create new revenue streams, and to protect the 
product we must curb the player exodus. Allowing private ownership of rugby franchises will 
also ensure more capital investment into professional rugby. The research showed that the 
outside shareholding in South African teams is currently limited to 49%, with the majority 




As discussed in this paper, if South African rugby makes the necessary proposed changes to 
the sport; if development and transformation is managed professionally and is made the 
responsibility of the commercial body and not the amateur organization, then the development 
and transformation programmes will be sustainable and successful. The success of these 
programmes will ensure that more players of colour will be able to play the sport and more will 
play for our professional teams and, ultimately, for the Springboks.  
The transformed team, which is more representative of our country’s demographic, will attract 
greater support from non-white South Africans. A more representative and inclusive game will 
generate more revenue for the sport. The increased revenue will then be proportionally used to 
increase the spend allocated to transformation and development under the professional 
company. This, in turn, will grow the development programmes and accelerate sustainable 
transformation. I believe that only then will rugby be considered an inclusive sport in South 
Africa. This will only be achieved by adopting the business principles and recommendations 
set out in this research paper. 
In conclusion, rugby needs to change. This change is not just limited to the field or the 
boardroom. Above all, it is a change in mindset that will achieve an inclusive game. 
Administrators and presidents of unions must give rugby back to the people, all the people of 
South Africa. This will be achieved through a constitutional change that allows rugby to be 
privatized. With additional funding, development will shift from being merely a tick-box 
exercise to keep politicians at bay. Transformation and development must be managed 
professionally and must be sustainable for it to succeed.  
For rugby to be inclusive and successful, all South Africans must stand together as the rainbow 
nation around the sport. The same rugby that black, coloured and white South Africans have 
played since 1886 will again bring South Africa together like Madiba did at Ellis Park in 1995, 
when the Springboks unified a nation through the actions of 15 brave men on the field – and 
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